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94tli Congress 
2d Session 





DECEMBER 30, 1975-JANUARY 9, 1976 


H. Res. 315 






Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations 

-097 WASHINGTON : 1976 


THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina 
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan 
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania 
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota 
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania 
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina 
LEO J. RYAN, California 
DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr., Michigan 
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey 
DON BONKER, Washington 

JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama 
PIERRE S. DU PONT, Delaware 
EDWARD G. BIESTER, Jr., Pennsylvania 
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas 

Marian A. Czarnecki, Chief of Staff 


House of Representatives, 

Committee ox International Relations, 

Washington, D.C., December 22, 1976. 

Tli is report has been submitted to the Committee on International 
Relations by one of its members, the Honorable Helen S. Meyner, who 
accompanied the special delegation of women Members of Congress to 
the People's Republic of China, headed by the Honorable Margaret M. 
Heckler. The Congresswomen, accompanied by Dr. Joyce Kallgren, 
visited the People's Republic of China by special invitation of then 
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and the trip was designated an official 
diplomatic mission by President Ford and Secretary of State 

The observations and findings in this report are those of the dele- 
gation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of 
the full Committee on International Relations. 


December 22, 1976. 
Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, 

Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Repre- 
sentatives, Washington, D.C. 
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am herewith transmitting a report on the 
China trip taken by the women Members of Congress during the last 
Christmas recess. 

We believe that the report may be of use to the members of the In- 
ternational Relations Committee and of the House and Senate as a 

With best wishes. 

Helen Meyner. 




Foreword ni 

Letter of transmittal v 

Introduction 1 

Foreign policy priorities of the People's Republic of China 4 

Domestic achievements and problems 9 

Agriculture is the key link 9 

Communes — progress today 11 

Tachai Brigades — models for the future 13 

The age-old problem of water 15 

The role of industry — dual development 17 

Revolutionary education 20 

Preschool and primary grades 21 

Middle schools — preparing for the countryside 22 

Higher education — the controversy 24 

May 7th cadre school — continuing education for bureaucrats 26 

Organizing people 29 

The neighborhood association 30 

The Women's Federation — model of a mass organization 32 

Social control 35 

The Chinese solution to social problems — prostitution and drugs 36 

Disputes and punishment 38 

The judges and judicial process 40 

Leadership and the Chinese Communist Party 42 

Appendixes : 

1. Itinerary 45 

2. Joint communique issued by the People's Republic of China and the 

United States on February 28, 1972. following President Richard 

Nixon's visit 49 

3. Funeral announcement for Chou En-lai 52 

4. Article entitled "How Taichai Builds Dp a Socialist Countryside.'' 

November 1974 54 

5. Map of trip: Map of Chengtu area 59 


Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2013 


This is a report of the congressional factfinding mission to the 
People's Republic of China, December 30, L975-January 9, 1976. The 
members of the delegation were Representatives Margaret M. Heckler 
(chairperson), Patsy T. Mink (deputy chairperson), Bella S. Abzug, 
Yvonne B. Burke, Elizabeth Ilolizman. Patricia Schroeder. Corinne 
C. Boggs, Cardiss Collins, Millicent Fenwick, Helen S. Meyner, 
and Gladys Noon Spelhnan. Prof. Joyce K. Kallgren served as admin- 
istrator <if the group. Dr. Freeman H. Carey was physician for the 
group. Others were Mr. John Mink, Mr. Martin Abzug, Mr. William 
Burke, Mrs. Filia Holtzman, Mr. James Schroeder, Hon. Robert 
Meyner, Mr. Reuben Spelhnan, Miss Belinda Heckler, Mr. Kevin Col- 
lins. Mr. Hale Boggs III, and Mrs. Sara Cary. An independent tele- 
vision crew was invited by the Chinese to accompany the delegation 
and did so. They were Mr. Thomas Fleming, Ms. Lynn Joiner, and 
Mr. James Arnold. 

Our delegation was the first group of congressional representatives 
to visit China after the trip of President Ford, December 2-5, and, 
as events have shown, the last to meet with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao- 
p'ing. Furthermore, the final day of our trip coincided with the an- 
nouncement of the death of Premier Chou En-lai. A major purpose of 
our trip was to understand better the significant problems both in- 
ternal and international that the Chinese believe they confront, to 
appraise the methods which the Chinese have adopted for solving their 
problems and their likelihood of success, and to observe for ourselves 
the links between domestic concerns and foreign policy intentions of 
the Chinese leadership. Through a realistic understanding of the pri- 
orities and leadership capabilities of the Chinese together with an es- 
timation of their success, the United States will be in a position to make 
more accurate assessments of Chinese nation-state realities and hence 
of our own foreign policy options. 

Each member of the delegation reached individual conclusions with 
respect to major topics, both domestic and foreign. All of us have been 
making and will continue to make separate judgments and policy rec- 
ommendations where appropriate. The trip, although brief, was in- 
tense in its effect. Each Congresswoman brought individual interests, 
assumptions, experiences, and expertise to a country that most had not 
visited before. Circumstances limited our ability to see much of such 
a highly diverse and varied nation, but our experience was sufficient 
to make us realize the very considerable diversity in customs, habits, 
stvle. and perhaps goals that characterize the People's Republic of 
China. The purpose of this report is to present some of our observa- 
tions on a range of issues so that the recommendations and decisions of 
the Cono-ress will be based upon as much data as possible. 

Certain observations of the group were common. Relations between 
the People's Republic of China and the United States are important 


and likel}' to increase in importance. Both the Chinese and the mem- 
bers of the delegation recognize that there are important differences 
between our two social systems. Progress in changing our relations 
may be slow not only because of the differences but also because of ex- 
ternal foreign policy considerations. The Chinese are realistic about 
these differences, and. for the moment, willing to wait, though they 
will obviously continue to present their views and desires forcefully. 

A visit to China offers the guest the opportunity to alter and adjust 
expectations. It is therefore of great importance to do all we can to 
enhance the degree of interchange between the peoples of our two 
countries. Just as American visitors to China have the opportunity to 
speak at length with their Chinese hosts about matters of concern, 
affording the opportunity to correct misapprehensions about intent 
and capabilities, so, too. the interchange may serve to correct or alter 
perceptions by the Chinese. In addition to the modest program of 
formal exchanges of scientists and doctors presently arranged through 
the Xational Academy of Sciences, together with informal trips of 
American citizens arranged through other means, we should do all 
that is possible to encourage visits to our country by representatives 
of Chinese political organizations. At present this interchange is not 
as equal as we might desire, but continued efforts to encourage ex- 
changes may eventually be successful. 

With respect to domestic goals, the Chinese are embarked upon a 
long-term effort to modernize their country and improve the standard 
of living of their citizens. We were all impressed with the enormous 
effort that this course demands of all Chinese. In the countryside in 
particular, investments of labor, and to a lesser extent of capital, have 
moved sections of China forward in their efforts. With respect to basic 
items of food, housing, medical services, and education, they have 
made substantial progress not only in increasing the availability of 
these goods and services, but also in distributing them throughout the 
country. Whether or not they will be able to maintain this progre-s 
together with the political conformity they expect from their citizens 
is not clear. The country still remains very poor and the road to mod- 
ernization is likely to be long, posing some difficult priority decisions 
for the leadership. For the present, education, agriculture, industry. 
all appear organized around the general aim of the leadership to en- 
courage national self-reliance and progress. This will require sub- 
stantial sacrifices on the part of all citizens to maintain the momentum 
that has been achieved. 

This report details these and related findings of our trip. Our itin- 
erary, together with the text of certain documents, are included in the 
appendix. For discussions of international relations it is imperative 
to understand the Shanghai communique to which the Chinese con- 
stantly refer. Accordingly, we have included it. Since a substantial 
portion of our trip involved visits to agricultural sites, and discussions 
with individuals in the countryside, we have included here a Chinese 
article on Tachai. which is considered by the leaders an agricultural 
model for the whole country. 

As can be seen from our itinerary as well as from the body of our 
report, itself, high ranking Chinese political leaders gave generously 
of their time throughout our journey. This afforded us the opportunity 
to have very frank discussions of considerable length on matters of 

mutual interest. These talks were not limited to problems of interna- 
tional relations, but, as our report indicates, dealt with important 
domestic problems such as education, agricultural development, prob- 
lems of legal and social education. These meetings were very valuable in 
providing us the opportunity to raise matters of concern with respect 
to what we had seen. 

Throughout our journey in the People's Republic of China, the 
thoughtfulness and competence of our Chinese interpreters were mat- 
extreme importance. We are pleased to acknowledge the central 
role they played in a successful trip. Although there are strong efforts 
to increase the number of English speakers in China, thoy are still 
fv\\\ particularly outside of Peking and Shanghai. The interpreter, 
therefore, is a key link in communication and understanding. 

Throughout our trip we were pleased that numerous efforts wore 
made to accommodate the requests of the delegation although our 
requests to visit the university and its library, a court in session, and 
i m were denied. While problems of transportation and distance 
dictated that the group travel together in Peking. Kweilin. and 
Szechwan, our hosts arranged alternate programs in Shanghai in an 
effort to afford options to the members for visits and discussions. 
Opportunities to move about on our own tended to be limited to early 
morning or late afternoon and evening, because of schedule pressures. 
With few exceptions the members of the delegation were able to move 
about unrestricted and to photograph as they wished. We were met 
with intense interest and courtesy even when communication proved 
3S ible. This cooperation was not limited to the delegation. Spe- 
cific note should be made of the thoughtfulness of our hosts with 
respect to the television crew which accompanied us. Their work was 
ably and graciously assisted by the Chinese at all times. 

We wish to express our appreciation to a number of individuals who 
provided assistance. First of all, Gen. Brent Scowcroft and others 
in the White House. National Security Council. Department of 
Defense, and Department of State helped facilitate our trip. Prior to 
our departure, Mr. William Glysteen met with us and reviewed several 
aspects of U.S. relations with China ; the staff of the Freer Gallery 
provided a briefing on various important historical sites that the dele- 
gation could expect to visit. In Hawaii, Admiral Noel Gayler provided 
us with an excellent briefing and the assistance of his staff. 

We wish to commend our administrator. Dr. Joyce Kallgren. vice 
chair of the Center for Chinese Studies. University of California. 
Berkeley. Dr. Kallgren shared her expertise on the People s Republic 
of China with us before, during, and after the trip and provided es- 
sential editorial guidance in the preparation of this report. 

In Peking, the staff of the American Liaison Office, particularly 
Acting Chief Harry Thayer and Mr. William Thomas, were hospita- 
ble and helpful during our Peking stay. 

Finally, we wish to acknowledge with thanks the assistance of the 
members of the People's Republic of China Liaison Office in Wash- 
ington who so generously gave of their time during the preparation 
and planning of the trip, and most of all, the members of the Chinese 
People s Institute of Foreign Affairs who were our hosts throughout 
our stay in China. They were unfailingly courteous and helpful in 
trying to provide us with an understanding of their country. 


Near the end of one lengthy discussion with a major Chinese political 
leader, he asked us to report "what the Chinese people are thinking 
about today." Without question the dominant theme of our discussions 
was a series of warnings about the Soviet Union and its intentions in 
contemporary international affairs. In assessing Chinese policies on 
foreign and security issues, their assumptions about Soviet intentions 
form the basic ground upon which a number of other options are built. 
In view of the fact that significant personnel changes may have oc- 
curred in China since our visit, the position, tone, and range of our 
discussions assume greater importance for an American assessment of 
the continuity of priorities. 

Our report on Chinese views in the area of international relations 
and security is derived from two lengthy discussions, first with Foreign 
Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, and then with Vice Minister Teng Hsiao- 
p'ing. who together with Madame Li Su-wen met with us for a lengthy 
morning session. Our impressions were reinforced in more informal 
discussions with our hosts both in Peking and elsewhere, together with 
the unstated premise in our briefing in the air raid tunnel in Peking. 

Because of their judgments about Soviet intentions and the likeli- 
hood of war, a variety of Chinese policies are distinguished in terms 
of theory and practice with immediate applications to American poli- 
cies in Europe, primarily in terms of XATO and with respect to the 
maintenance of American security agreements and forces in certain 
parts of Asia, Finally, it may well be that the high priority that the 
Chinese placed on warnings with respect to Soviet developments ac- 
counts for the rather limited attention in the discussion to bilateral 
relations between the People's Republic of China and the United 

How and why do the Chinese see World War III developing? In 
theoretical terms, the Chinese said that war developed independent of 
man's will. In today's world, they believed that talk of detente is an 
illusion. Despite talk of peace, there isn't any: nor is there genuine 
disarmament. The reality, they said, was that the international situa- 
tion day by day is more tense. They did not speak of "imminent'' war 
and their language for a time frame became less precise, with use of 
such words as likelihood, and such periods as 3, 5, and 7 years, based on 
the continued development of superpower "hegemony" — which to them 
means the Soviet Union. Though the Chinese consider both the Soviet 
Union and the United States as superpowers capable of beginning a 
third world war. their present observation is that the United States 
is mainly on the defensive and the Soviet Union mainly in an aggres- 
sive posture. Hence their emphasis on a Soviet threat. 

The evidence for their position cited in our discussions is quite simi- 
lar to views expressed in major Chinese foreign publications, such as 


the Peking Review, [ndeed, the Language used in our meetings mir- 
rored that published at the time of our visit The argument runs as 
follows: the military development and expansion of one superpower, 
phis its increased involvement in such areas as Europe (Portugal) 
and Africa (Angola) is strong evidence of Long-range intentions. This 
argument they believed is supported by evidence with respect to nu- 
clear as well as conventional weapons development. 

For example, they argued that since the Partial Nuclear Test Ban, 
the development of military force by the Soviet Union has become 
more pronounced. Whereas the U.S.S.B. was behind the United Stat.- 
in 1963, it has since caught up, and by the 1974 Vladivostok meetings 
i lie United States had admitted equilibrium. Beyond nuclear balance, 
our hosts observed, the conventional situation was even more perilous. 
According to British sources, they said, the Soviet Union exceeded the 
I nit .'d States and its Western European allies in conventional weap- 
ons, and Soviet naval capabilities are a strong challenge to the United 
States with a presence in the Pacific, Indian, and Mediterranean. 
Within the last 10 years, Soviet armed forces have grown from 3 mil- 
lion to 4.2 million. In most areas there is an increase of military bases. 
The Chinese asked: "What is the use of so many things? Some day 
their hands will grow itchy." 

As lor the region in which the war is most likely to occur, the Chi- 
ne e view is that Europe must be seized and therefore the biggest con- 
centration of force is there. In addition, the Middle East and the Medi- 
terranean are danger points. In the light of the seriousness with which 
the Chinese speak and write of the likelihood of hostilities, Chinese 
policies with respect to the American presence in Europe and selected 
parts in Asia and their views with respect to the military forces of 
our XATO allies are largely consistent. 

When questions on the Chinese policies toward an American pres- 
ence in Europe and Asia were raised, the Chinese position was ex- 
pressed on two levels. In theoretical terms, the Chinese call for the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from all countries. This point was clearly 
stated in all discussions. However, in the light of present circum- 
stances, there is the need to take reality into account. Since one super- 
power is well armed and is present in Europe and Asia, the Chinese 
said they understood that the United States had reason to maintain 
ti'oops in Europe and parts of Asia. Even further, the Chinese urged 
us to maintain a "truly" equal partnership with European countries 
and with the Japanese, and said they believed that the United States 
would do so. The use of the term "certain parts of Asia" was inten- 
tional, designed perhaps to exclude Korea. Here removal of our forces 
was linked to "the peaceful reunification of Korea" with no further 
elaboration as our hosts indicated this was a complicated problem 
with a long history. 

Beyond supporting a continued military 'presence, our hosts argued 
that in view of the arms race which resulted partially from Soviet 
development, it was desirable that the United States European allies 
devote more .funds to military preparedness, and apparently the Chi- 
nese have so advised them. But they also indicated that in their view, 
increased appropriations might be necessary by the United States. The 
reason for the increased military preparedness arises from their belief 


that only through such preparedness will Soviet hegemony be re- 
strained. Thus they rejected what they saw to be a possible "Munich" 
trend, arguing that the Soviet Union would only be responsive to a 
strong posture. It is no use to fear the Soviet Union ; if war is inevit- 
able, they said, unprepa redness spells grief. 

Given this series of statements, we were extremely interested in 
Chinese perceptions with respect to their own roles and state of 
preparation, and accordingly asked them about their policies. They 
emphasized that they were a peaceful people and yet were making 
their own defensive arrangements as suggested in the statement by 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung : "Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, 
and never seek hegemony." In explaining the implications of this 
injunction, the Chinese noted its defensive character, a point that 
was reiterated in a variety of ways. They said that as a developing 
country there were a number of extremely pressing domestic prob- 
lems on the road to modernization. They were therefore integrating 
defensive measures into their overall economic development program. 
In addition, they believed they were doing their share by the repeated 
emphasis on Soviet war potential and threats, together with their own 
internal preparations. 

Tangible evidence of their domestic preparations was provided in 
our tour on January 3 of one of the Peking underground air raid 
tunnels. The delegation visited the underground air raid tunnel of 
Ta Sa Lan alley. In a briefing presented to us by Mr. Kao Shih-fen, 
Director of the General Office of the People's Air Piaid Precaution 
Committee, he outlined the history and development of this tunnel. 
Using maps and charts. Mr. Kao reported that construction of this 
tunnel began in 1969 and had continued through stages of development 
and extension for the past 7 years. The area served was an alley on 
which there were many department stores and shops (each of which 
had separate openings to the tunnel area). On normal weekdays there 
might be a total of 80,000 shoppers in the alley with more on Sundays 
and holidays. The tunnel as developed could provide shelter for some 
10,000 people, all of whom could be underground with a 6-minute 
warning, based on Chinese experience with air raid practices. We 
were told that similar tunnels exist in other cities as far north as 

According to Mr. Kao and our own observations as we walked 
through the tunnel, a number of safety measures were already in place 
in the tunnel. There were phones, toilets, running water, underground 
power and facilities for purifying the air. In addition, the Chinese 
intend to install hospital facilities and other amenities as circum- 
stances permit. There was space for such development. 

TVe were told that the tunnels were largely built by contributed 
labor from the 1,800 shopkeepers of the 45 stores on the alley, of 
whom almost 30 percent were women. Financing was provided par- 
tially by the Central government, with the remainder from local 
sources, but we do not know the percentages. Emphasizing self- 
reliance, the workers had developed a small brick factory to make 
bricks from local mud. Mr. Kao indicated the work had been difficult 
and many obstacles had been encountered because they had little ex- 
perience in this kind of work. Work itself depended on the yearly 

circumstances and plans. In the past year they had installed some 
equipment and underground silos for grain storage. When we visited 
it did not appear that a large work force was engaged in the activity. 

According to Mr. Kao. many tunnels were connected to other tun- 
nels permitting the people to eventually walk out to the suburbs. In 
the case of Ta Sa Lan, it was possible to reach the southern suburbs 
in approximately 3 hours. We do not know to what degree this is true 
of other underground tunnels in Peking. Surprisingly, our Chinese 
hosts would not permit filming of the underground facilities, though 
such films would seem to lend further corroboration to Chinese ex- 
pressed policy. 

In addition to the graphic evidence presented by the tour as support 
to Chinese statements, we found other references to the storing of 
grain at various visits to agricultural facilities in Szechwan and 
Shanghai. There is, therefore, substantial evidence of domestic prep- 
aration ,for war in China. It did not seem to be conducted on an emer- 
gency basis but it obviously represents some diversion of resources. 

In addition to the question of domestic policies, questions were 
raised with the Chinese with respect to their general policies of support 
for national liberation movements specifically with respect to Israel 
and also with respect to interest in and aid to more distant areas 
such as Africa. Chinese responses were interesting, not only for their 
insight into perceptions of national interest, but also as indicative 
of areas of dominant versus subordinate concern. 

With respect to Angola, the Chinese distinguished carefully between 
what they saw as a war of liberation versus an internal civil struggle. 
They explained their initial support of liberation forces in Angola as 
essentially based on their interest in assisting nationalist efforts to 
force the Portuguese to leave. Once that struggle had been won, the 
war shifted from a nationalist war to a domestic civil war — which was 
their view in December 1975 to January 1976. They then withdrew, 
wishing to avoid alignment with one faction. Partisan support by the 
Soviet Union — that is, aid to the MPLA — reflected in Chinese eyes 
deep involvement in an essentially domestic situation, presumably for 
Soviet interests. The Chinese believed that this Soviet action ran 
counter to their self -proclaimed policies of noninvolvement in domes- 
tic affairs. Chinese criticism emerged largely from the fact that they 
saw Soviet involvement as coming after the end of the political strug- 
gle. The Chinese said they supported the American position calling for 
the withdrawal o.f all foreign troops. Subsequent Chinese actions in 
the United Nations reinforce this statement . 

In addition to queries about their position on Angola, we also asked 
the Chinese to present their views with respect to Chinese interest in 
and support for the Palestinian liberation movement and for the con- 
tinent of Africa in general. In these cases, their responses were rela- 
tively brief. They reaffirmed their support for the goals of the PLO 
but in the case of Africa, indicated that though interest in African 
development remained, because of their own pressing problems there 
was likely to be considerable limitation to their ability to provide help. 

As wide ranging as our discussions were, there was little attention 
paid to bilateral American-Chinese relations. This was true despite 
queries about Chinese satisfaction with the result of the visit of Presi- 


dent Ford a? well as other questions dealing with American-Chinese 
relations. In the light of the relatively modest amount of attention 
paid to these problems, in contrast to some prior congressional visits, 
it is essential to report carefully our impressions. 

In our discussions, the Chinese expressed, as they have in published 
statements, their general satisfaction with the visit of President Ford. 
They indicated no concern about the lack of a communique, saying 
that the speeches of all participants might be viewed in lieu of a 
communique. Since our trip followed relatively closely upon that of 
President Ford, such a response might have been expected. Perhaps 
less expected, in the light of earlier congressional visits, was the rela- 
tively slight attention paid to the issue of the status or future of 
Taiwan. At no time did the Chinese choo-e to initiate direct discus- 
sion of Taiwan. The sole reference occurred in their response to a 
question about how our two countries might move more closely to- 
gether. In answering they mentioned the Shanghai communique of 
1972 and the need for its implementation. Only when asked to be 
specific did they amend their comments to provide a specific reference 
to the three conditions, namely (1) withdrawal of all forces from 
Taiwan: (2) abrogation of the Joint Defense Treaty: and (3) sever- 
ing of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. They added, however, that 
they understood that the American Government felt it was difficult 
at present to implement these policies and they, the Chinese, could 

Other queries with respect to bilateral relations were answered but 
clearly without the depth of analysis that marked our discussions of 
Soviet threat. Thus on the matter of trade, they acknowledged that its 
volume would vary from year to year but did not overtly link its 
level with the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. 

Only on the issue of exit visas did the lack of formal relations come 
to the fore. Here, in response to a request by some congressional Mem- 
bers for attention to certain hardship cases — that is. American citi- 
zens of Chinese descent who wished to see aging relatives in China, 
or where terminal illness made an exit visa to the United States of 
high priority — did they indicate that regularized relations between 
our two countries would permit more ease in meeting such requests. 
They did agree, however, to review the Congresswomen's requests. 


To travel through China is to pee on every side both the tremendous 
Achievements and problems of the Chinese. Fundamental to success 
is agriculture; consequently, the stabilization of high yields together 
with increasing: production is an essential component of efforts to raise 
the standard of living of those in the countryside as well as cities, 
let alone to modernize the country. It is understandable, therefore, 
why so much of our visit focused upon one or another aspect of agri- 
cultural development. 

It should be made clear at this juncture that obviously the develop- 
ment of industry is also essential for China's policy of self-reliance. 
We will comment at various points on differing aspects of the indus- 
trial development with which we had experience, but the overriding 
impression of our trip, largely occasioned by the emphasis on agri- 
cultural units and the extensive traveling in Chengtu and its envi- 
rons, is the remaining importance of agriculture, as the key to future 
Chinese achievements. Whether or not the Chinese will be successful in 
their efforts not only to stabilize agricultural production but also 
to sustain the rate of progress, through the means they have chosen, 
remains unclear. But the nature of their efforts and the paths they 
seem likely to follow appear relatively clear from our trip. 

Crucial though agriculture and industry are to China's future, it 
is equally important to keep in mind the additional goal of China's 
leaders, namely to maintain the revolutionary spirit and style of 
action to which they attribute their success in 1949 and which they 
consider essential for the maintenance of a socialist industry. In this 
respect, progress should be viewed in the context of a new revolu- 
tionary man under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. 
Consequently, an understanding of the Chinese agricultural and in- 
dustrial efforts must be accompanied by a close look at Chinese educa- 
tional priorities and methods in order to understand the close inter- 
dependence of these activities. 

In addition to these two emphases, the delegation intends to report 
here on the broader intentions of Chinese leaders reflected in their 
social mechanisms for insuring enthusiastic support for socially 
approved goals together with judicious use of sanctions where neces- 
sary. In this context efforts to enhance the role of women serves as a 
good example of the use of a mass organization to insure support for 
a social goal. Finally, the delegation reports on the use of sanctions 
when other means fail. 

Agriculture Is the Key Lixk 

Much has been written about the importance of agriculture in 
China. Many who have visited before us have commented upon de- 
velopments in China since 1949. Indeed, from the earliest days of 


78-C07--7G 8 


American visitors in the middle of the 19th century, people have 
known that the livelihood of China and its political stability rested 
upon the capacity of a leadership to meet the needs for survival of 
this vast nation, to insure a bare minimum of cereals and vegetables 
for the nation, and to provide the means of transport so that excess 
from one sector of the country could be made available to people in 
less fortunate circumstances. The decline of agricultural productivity 
in the 20th century is also well known. It was occasioned by a variety 
of factors; not the least of these were the increasing instability of 
the society as traditional authority vanished, the erosion of soil and 
water resources, the decay in transportation systems largely along 
waterways, and the rising banditry that occurred during the years 
of the warlords, together with the large scale destruction that accom- 
panied "World War II, followed by 4 years of intense civil war. 

"With the establishment of the People's Kepublic of China in 1949, 
the nation, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party 
and its leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung, set about to revolutionize the 
countryside as well as fundamentally to change the means of pro- 
duction in China's rural areas. All of these changes have occurred in 
the past 27 years against the backdrop of a rising population now esti- 
mated to be well over 800 million people. Thus increased production 
was necessary not only to meet the needs of a burgeoning population 
but also slowly to raise the standard of living for all of Chinese 

The developments have followed two paths. There have been efforts 
to reclaim land, improve the quality of soil, stabilize water supply, 
lower the saline content of the earth and increase the availability and 
use of fertilizer. In addition and of equal importance have been the 
changes in Chinese society that began with land reform, 1949-52. 
These efforts progressed through mutual aid teams sharing labor; 
to agricultural cooperatives and advanced agricultural cooperatives 
which initially provided income and grain on the basis of contributed 
land and labor, and eventually solely on the basis of labor; up to the 
communes established in 1958. Substantially refined since then, the 
communes of 1976 remain the basic administrative unit of China's 
rural scene, combining local government together with economic poli- 
cies, social welfare, education, militia training and other functions 
including much of the local rural industrial development. Varying 
in geographical size as well as total population they now apparently 
number about 50,000 and range in population from 10.000 to 50.000. 

The communes 'of China are composed of three levels of political 
and economic responsibility. At the top is the commune revolutionary 
committee which manages commune wide activities including hos- 
pitals, some social services, together with apportionment of grain 
targets. Beneath the commune organization unit are the production 
brigades. The brigades, depending upon geography, population, lo- 
cation, wealth, et cetera, may manage health stations as well as brigade 
developed sideline activities. Each brigade is composed of a number of 
production teams frequently similar in size to traditional villages. It 
is here that work assignments are made and work points determined. 
No one can be removed from the work assigned in the production 
team without the concurrence of team leadership. 


The income of the individual and the family in rural China is 
largely determined by the total work points of the family together 
with the productivity of their efforts as reflected in team output. How- 
ever a valuable supplement to the income and standard of living of 
the individual and the family is derived from the private plots. 
The so-called private plots consist of a small portion of land used for 
raising pigs, fruit trees, a few chickens, or vegetables. The products 
so raised are sold to state agencies and the proceeds kept by the family 
or individual. 

In summary therefore, the income of a Chinese family is derived 
from the combined workpoints of all translated into cash. Some of 
the funds are used for grain purchases, some for necessities, some for 
modest luxuries and some saved. In addition, the income may be sup- 
plemented by cash or gifts from a child employed elsewhere or in the 
commune small scale factory where a monthly salary is received. 

The purchasing power of the income is relatively high given the 
fact that commune medical care usually costs 1 yuan per year for 
eligibility for coverage, that housing in a commune is free or nominal 
in cost, and school fees, nursery care and most necessary products 
have not increased in price in the last 20 years. 

What is described above is the model commune life. It varies de- 
pending upon the total number of laborers/peasants available. Some 
production teams have a large portion of workers who are aged or 
too young to engage in full scale production, some teams work rocky 
soil, of poor quality, where water is distant. In all these cases the total 
income of the team suffers. In 1975-76 the commune and its constitu- 
ent parts, the brigade and team constituted the local level reality of 
life in China. 

As indicated above, there is substantial room for differences among 
the standards of living of individuals in one team or another, indeed 
between families as well, depending not only on skill but also on family 
composition and related matters. Because of these differences and the 
fact that commune life still includes a substantial component of 
private enterprise represented by the private plots, Chinese Communist 
leadership has encouraged the development of model production bri- 
gades which have usually abolished the private plots and raised the 
level of decisionmaking above that of the production team (village) 
to a larger geographic and population level. In the future the new 
model, referred to as a "Tachai brigade,*' will become increasingly com- 
mon in China. Before discussing this future development, however, 
we want to report on the average commune model, as we saw it. 


In the suburbs of Shanghai is P'eng-pu Commune. Located close to 
this large metropolitan area, to which it can sell its crops, namely 
vegetables, and from which it could easily buy needed goods, P'eng-pu, 
by location and by product, is not a typical commune. It is wealthy 
and serves as a model of how the organizational system may work when 
conditions are good. 


This commune, we were told, is composed of 4,300 families, totaling 
approximately 21,000 people, divided into nine production brigades 
and 78 production teams. It covered 820 hectares. In addition to vege- 
tables, some grains are grown. Income is also derived from sideline 
occupations of fish raising, poultry and small scale industry. 

The history of this commune is quite similar to those in other parts 
in China. After land reform, the level of organization proceeded 
through mutual aid teams, agricultural producer cooperatives, to 
advanced producer cooperatives where individuals earned only from 
their labor (and not for the land they contributed, but were provided 
the five guarantees of food, clothing, education, fuel and burial). In 
1958 the commune was established. 

Our hosts gave the delegation a variety of indicators of progress 
in the commune. Vegetable production was more than %y 2 times that 
of 1949, and double the output of 1957 (before the establishment of the 
commune) . The variety of vegetables had risen from 75 in 1949 to 208 
in 1976. In addition to fresh vegetables, the commune raised 23,000 
pigs (most of them apparently by families on their private plots) to- 
gether with 1,000 sheep, 310 cows and 120,000 chickens. An area of 
180,000 square meters was used to cultivate a very profitable crop of 
mushrooms. On the rivers and waterways they raised ducks, fish and 
cultured pearls. Since 1965 and the Cultural Revolution, commune 
members had devoted efforts to such projects as the growing of trees 
around the villages, and emphasized the overall development of animal 
husbandry and rural mechanization. The profits from income — derived 
not only from crops but also products of sideline enterprises — have re- 
sulted in the purchase of 20 trucks, 139 tractors, and 214 electric pumps. 
In addition they have built 31 sluice gates for water control, as well 
as 25 pumping stations for drainage. They installed 12 kilometers of 
pipe for waste water from Shanghai which (after treatment) was 
used for irrigation. Machinery repairs were done in the commune as 
well as the forging of some machine tools. 

The result of all these endeavors was to raise the standard of living 
of the households in P'eng-pu. Our hosts told us that the average in- 
come for a household of 4J people was 1,000 yuan ($500 U.S.). Each 
laborer's income was estimated at 450 yuan a year with expenses esti- 
mated at 120 yuan per person leaving a portion for savings. The ad- 
vantages of the commune were not limited to income. It provided its 
members with broadcast facilities, a small library, a sparetime peasant 
college, nine primary schools and one middle school. We were told that 
in 1975 all children-above the age of 7 were in school and that nurseries 
and kindergartens were located in production teams or brigades. 

With respect to health care, the provisions of this commune were 
standard, namely a commune hospital, clinics at the brigade level 
and medical workers for the teams. In one home interview, we dis- 
covered that the medical program, which was uniformly popular, 
provided, in serious cases, for treatment outside the commune, where 
contracts apparently existed between the commune and certain Shang- 
hai hospitals for specialized cases too serious for medical facilities 
and/or stnff of the commune. Since 1968 they had established a com- 
prehensive prepaid medical system where each adult paid 2 yuan and 
each child 1 yuan for free medical care. 


The impressions derived from the briefing and tour were supple- 
mented by visits to selected homes. Various members of the delegat ion 
went info small neat homes or apartments (in the case of new dwell- 
ings) where they had the opportunity to speak with some of the com- 
mune members. Though the specifics differed from family to fam- 
ily, it was clear that the individuals and families we visited were 
well off. While housing was cramped, it was adequate (though heat 
was lacking). The average monthly income varied. In one case it was 
200 yuan a month, reflecting the fact that the family had five chil- 
dren, all of whom were working full time, and hence the household 
income was rather high. The respondent in the family indicated that 
expenses totaled approximately 100 yuan a month, leaving them with 
substantial savings and hence they had been able to purchase such 
items as a clock, sewing machine and bicycles. We also learned that 
some of the peasants contributed one day of work per week to the 
commune (though we do not know how widespread this practice may 
be). Formal retirement programs did not exist (as indeed they do 
not in rural China) ; rather the work assignments will be reduced 
to lighter work for aging parents. Children are expected to contribute 
to the support of their aged parents (and did so gladly). 

The conditions just described represent a model case where the 
commune is favorably located with respect to markets and climate 
has made maximum use of its advantages together with political or- 
ganization to raise the standard of living of its population, to finance 
out of its own profits the costs of increased mechanization and im- 
provement of its lands. Other communes, more remotely located with 
a somewhat differing population structure, with more difficult terrain 
and the like may well have progressed less successfully. 


Since the efforts of the Chinese leadership are to raise the stand- 
ards of the whole countryside, and to minimize Government invest- 
ment, self-reliance is both an economically advantageous policy as 
well as a politically important one. One consequence of self-reliance, 
however, is that certain regional and local differences may persist, 
and indeed widen. Consequently, the country has now adopted a 
model which shows how self-reliance and hard work may provide 
progress and reduce differences among areas by raising the productiv- 
ity of the poorer units. The unit to be emulated is Tachai, a produc- 
tion brigade in the province of Shensi. Tachai was a poor brigade 
that faced a myriad of obstacles in its efforts to improve the quality 
of life. But it not only increased its contribution to the state but 
also improved the living conditions of 80 families (-100 people). The 
Tachai success story illustrates not only the results of hard work and 
ingenuity, but also the role that changes in administrative organiza- 
tion can bring about, namely the shifting to brigade level of decision- 
making power with respect to certain economic policies together with 
the abandonment of the private plots. We have included in our ap- 
pendix a brief description of ^aehai brigade activities as published 
by the Chinese to illustrate the workings of this model. Now, the 
slogan "In Agriculture Learn from Tachai" has been echoed through- 


out China. In the late summer of 1975, a nationwide conference to dis- 
cuss the Tachai experience was held and there seems little doubt that 
this model will continue to be extolled as the future for Chinese agri- 
culture. In the course of our trip, we visited one Tachai-type brigade 
in the outskirts of Chengtu, Szechuan province, where we saw an 
example of how this type of organization worked. 

Tien Yuan commune is located in Hsintu County quite close to 
the city of Chengtu. It is composed of some 20,000 individuals who 
are divided into 15 brigades. Three of the brigades are Tachai-type 
brigades and we visited one of them. The production brigade we 
visited was composed of 13 production teams made up of 486 house- 
holds with a population of 2.036 individuals and a laboring force 
of 973. It cultivates a total of 219 mou or 36 plus acres (a mou is equal 
to one-sixth of an acre). 

We were told that efforts, under the leadership of Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung and members of the brigade, emphasized self-reliance and 
making an effort to carry out the revolution and "work hard to change 
the face of this country." In the course of the briefing we learned 
what this effort required and what had been achieved. The products 
of this brigade were rice, wheat, rape seed, tobacco, and honey. The 
production of grain in 1949 was 200 kilos-per-mou and by 1975 was 
"900 kilos-per-mou. By 1975 the brigade was raising 2.053 pigs. From 
240 hives of bees they had gathered 24,000 kilos of honey, in addi- 
tion to growing some 1.7 million vegetables for the city of Chengtu. 
Coupled with the emphasis on agriculture this brigade had organized 
individuals into other occupations such as house repair, grain proc- 
essing, and a variety of small-scale industries such as the making of 
clothes, straw hats, baskets, et cetera. From this agricultural base 
together with the occupations the brigade has been able to expand 
production and accumulate savings sufficient for the purchase of 7 
trucks, 2 rice harvesters and rice grinders, 40 threshers. 2 sets of elec- 
tric pumping stations as well as finances to set up the grain and side- 
line production shops. They were able, thus, to semimechanize the 
land. With the growth of products, the contribution to the state was 
larger, the public accumulation of funds for the brigade increased, 
and the living standards of the people also improved. 

Here as in Shanghai, general prosperity was translated into indi- 
vidual terms. Each individual received 565 jin of grain. Annual in- 
come was 124 yuan per person. Thus, the brigade was not onlv able 
to have sufficient food and clothing but many citizens had a bicycle, 
radio, watch, or sewing machine. 

As in the commune, the attention to education and development 
of medical facilities ranked hififh in the estimation of the brigade 
members. Before 1949 no individual had been to the university and 
only three persons had attended middle school. Since 1949. 21 had 
been to the university and 370 to middle school. The brigade had 
itself developed a primary and a middle school (based on the so-called 
"open door" policy which was designed to integrate schoolwork with 
production). All may attend these schools without entrance exam- 
inations. We were told that frequently old peasants come to lecture 
at the school and explain how difficult circumstances were before 1949. 
All students participated in production work in the field. 


With respect to health care, as recently as 1965, doctors were few 
and health facilities quite limited. Since then a medical station at 

the brigade has been established and five "barefoot doctors'' work 
with teams. The individuals pay 1 yuan per year for medical care 
and it is provided free within the brigade. The welfare fund of the 
brigade is available for assistance if care outside is necessary. 

The brigade representatives emphasized the work that remained. 
Their plans reflected the continuing agricultural emphasis. They had 
hopes of achieving 1 ton of grain per man per year as well as elec- 
trification by the 1980's. They intended to emphasize the planting 
of trees around the villages, fields, roads, and canals. They believed 
that an important development for them would be the building of an 
aqueduct. Their emphasis on the future was reflected in their sum- 
mary assessment "our production level is still not very high and the 
level of mechanization still low . . . we have a long way to go yet 
to what is required of us by the party and Chairman Mao." 

The discussions above focused upon two examples of the successful 
integration of political goals together with the economic realities of 
the development cycles. These two units. P'eng-pu and the "Tachai" 
brigade in Tien Yuan Commune demonstrated the ability of agri- 
cultural units to maximize advantages partially through political 
mobilization, but also through the development of social services (such 
as schools and hospitals) to supplement still low individual incomes. 
These success stories are impressive, but thev are not universal in 


In a number of instances, the problems of Chinese agriculture are 
beyond the scope of a single commune. For example, a large-scale ef- 
fort, involving a work force equal to the total population of two com- 
munes of the P'eng-pu size were concentrated in one single irrigation 
campaign we observed. It should be kept in mind, therefore, that many 
of China's agriculture problems require efforts beyond those of a 
single commune. This is particularly true in programs to develop 
water resources for agriculture. During our visit we had the oppor- 
tunity to look closely at one such development. Its achievements and 
limitations are a good example of the range remaining in China. 

The irrigation project of Tukiangyen is located about 51 li from 
Chengtu. Szechuan, of which Chengtu is the capital, is often referred 
to as the ricebowl of China because it has a fertile plain which has 
provided excess rice for the other provinces of China. For more than 
2.000 years, Chinese leaders have recognized the importance of water 
conservancy for the rice needs of China's peasants. 

Many have argued that the immense nature of the irrigation and 
water transportation projects has either caused or most certainly rein- 
forced the need for a central government capable of developing and 
organizing the work forces necessary to control water in China. Thus 
over 2.200 years ago. a local magistrate, engineer Li Po, in the Chengtu 
area initiated the irrigation project which our delegation visited in 
1976. He recognized the need for water control of the Min River and 
initiated a canal system together with a dike for diversion into an 
inner and outer canal. Since that time, peasants in the area have built 

up rich lands in the lower areas of the Min and the magistrate him- 
self has been honored by the Chinese Communist leaders who have 
refurbished a local temple testifying to the high esteem in which they 
hold him. 

Since its beginning about 250 B.C., the condition of the irrigation 
system has varied depending upon political developments. Our hosts 
told us the system had fallen into severe disrepair by 1949 but that 
since then they had recognized that "water conservancy is the lifeline 
of agriculture" and continuous efforts had been devoted to expanding 
and strengthening the system. 

In 1949 we were told only 2 million mou were irrigated by the sys- 
tem. By 1958 this had increased to 5.9 million mou. At this time Chair- 
man Mao visited the area, pointed out certain improvements to be 
made in the continued remodeling of the system, and commented that 
"Building Socialism" required the development of water conservancy. 
By 1975 the project was providing irrigation for 8 million mou of 
land. The short range goal was to reach 10 million mou and the longer 
range plan some 15 million mou. 

The importance of the system and the complicated consequences of 
its development require more than the above brief description. In 
order to understand the role of the project and the scope of personnel 
involved, some background on agricultural development in this pro- 
vince is essential. Roughly 12 percent of the arable province of Szech- 
uan is irrigated, and in 1972 some 12 percent of 840,000 mou were 
cultivated. In view of the importance of the province as a supplier of 
grain to other parts of China, great emphasis has been placed on the 
achievement of high stable yield. In 1956 the targets for this province 
were set at 800 jin (400 kilo) per mou, which has apparently not yet 
been achieved for the province, though it had for the model we visited. 
The contribution of Tukiangyen has been in reclaiming previously dry 
land, in stabilizing water resources and hence providing some security 
for production by communes in this rich area. Assuming that roughly 
a one-fourth ton of grain is allotted for a person, each additional ton 
of export grain provides for a rising standard of consumption as well 
as making available additional resources for the government (which 
established goals and prices for the communes). 

The period of Chinese Communist leadership has seen a steady ex- 
pansion of areas irrigated in Szechuan. In some years, dry lands were 
brought under irrigation through aqueducts and building of pumping 
stations and pipelines in the Tu Kiang Yen project. In other years 
reinforcement of the embankments together with development of dams 
have made it possible to regulate the water flow, control for floods and 
develop some hydroelectric capacity. It must be kept in mind that the 
irrigation system not only supports agriculture but also provides bene- 
fits to industry together with its transportation functions. 

One consequence of burgeoning water conservancy projects was that 
substantia] organizational problems increasingly appeared. For ex- 
ample, revising canals and enlarging their capacities had implication 
for the small fields that are normally tended by teams and even 
brigades. The development of the system and its accompanying canals 
has implications for boundaries, responsibilities and developments 
within each commune as well as between communes themselves. These 


problems were recognized in brigade discussions, when Chinese leaders 
said that the economics of mechanization, even at the low level at 
which they were planning, might require the realignment of fields 
and assignments in order to maximize the use 4 of equipment. In terms 
of the water system such problems were clearly on the horizon. 

Though the Tukiangyen project was managed by a modest force of 
technicians totaling some 400 in all, some aspects of related projects 
were massive in their labor needs. For example, returning from the 
visit to the project itself, we had the opportunity to observe at close 
hand one small portion of the canal changes required in the project. 
We encountered a large irrigation force involving 40,000 people 1 en- 
gaged in filling in an old canal and digging a new one. This work 
force — drawn from the surrounding nine communal counties — had 
undertaken to complete the task in 1 month. 'When one considers that 
the work forces in the communes we visited averaged approximately 
50 percent of the total commune population we estimate that the 
40.000 workers constituted the total work force of four communes 
and or half the work force of eight. The work was done by hand, prob- 
ably in a manner similar to the way the old magistrate built his first 
irrigation project 2,000 years ago. 

Information about financing for the project was difficult to get. Xo 
figures on total costs were available to us, but the ongoing funding of 
the project was raised from a water tax of one yuan per mou of land 
that was irrigated by the Min River Tukiangyen project, providing 
once again an example of local self-reliance and financing. 


As our itinerary shows, the opportunities to visit industrial sites 
Avere limited. Formal visits by members of the delegation were made to 
a textile factory in Kweilin and an electrical machinery factory in 
Shanghai. It would be misleading, however, to assume that evidence 
of industrial development was limited to these two visits. In all the 
agricultural sites visited, mention was made of the close relation be- 
tween agriculture and industry, and we had numerous occasions to see 
small scale enterprises affiliated with communes, the brigade, and 
schools — both middle and college. In addition, the tour through the 
Shanghai Industrial Exhibition afforded the opportunity to discuss 
with our hosts the variety of products that China now produces for 

From a number of standpoints the lack of emphasis on large scale 
urban industry is reflective of the reality of industrial development 
in China, and of Chinese hopes for the future. In order to place this 
reality in perspective, it is essential to keep in mind certain character- 
istics of industrial development that characterized China in 1949. 
When China began to develop industrial capabilities in the late 19th 
century, there were substantial handicaps. The difficulties came not 
only from domestic problems of transportation and lack of skilled 
labor, but also the consequences of the unequal treaty system. The in- 
that did develop tended to be located on the eastern seacoast. in 
and around the treaty ports and in the northeastern provinces orig- 

1 Congressworaan TToltzman recalls they were told "20,000" people. 
78-097—76 4 


inally detached by Japan in the pre-World War II period and devel- 
oped under Japanese control. The capacities of plants were limited 
by the bombing and dislocation of the Sino- Japanese War, the destruc- 
tion that accompanied the final months of World War II. as well as the 
civil war which followed. In the early years of the Chinese Communist 
Government, with substantial Soviet help, old industrial sites were 
repaired and enlarged, and new ones established. But the emphasis on 
local development with local financing for local markets was largely 
a consequence of decisions made after 1958 when the communes were 

Between 1959-62. the Chinese people endured years of hardship 
caused by weather difficulties, the withdrawal of Russian technicians 
as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and poor planning and 
organization by the Chinese themselves. Once recovery from the dras- 
tic agricultural difficulties had occurred the Chinese embarked upon a 
careful modernization program that was designed, to decentralize in- 
dustry and provide for local products at the same time that basic in- 
dustrial capacity, controlled by central government ministries, was 
expanded. By 1975-76. there were scores of small-scale enterprises 
financed and largely directed by communes and brigades who supply 
local articles for consumption, or. on subcontract, to nearby factories. 
There were also small school factories, subcontracting from nearby 
plants and industrial complexes. At the same time the large-scale cen- 
trally financed and directed industries in the basic field? of armaments, 
machine plants, and highly complex and interdependent projects such 
as the Anshan Steel Works also expanded. 

In the light of Chinese developments since 1965 and the aftermath 
of the great proletarian cultural revolution, industrial development 
continues as a high priority but without one of the characteristics com- 
monly expected in the western society. The Chinese intend to try and 
industrialize without urbanizing. That is. they intend to emphasize 
the self-reliance theme found everywhere in China and already men- 
tioned with respect to agriculture, and to avoid the gigantic growth 
of cities with their concomitant problems. 

Their efforts to develop local industry locally financed have had a 
number of sequences. Locally financed industry lessens the drain on 
central government resources. Locally developed factories can be inte- 
grated into communes providing the opportunity for increased profits 
at the commune level while reducing pressure for urbanization com- 
mon to many other countries' modernization efforts. The difficulties of 
such a policy are very substantial. They derive from problems of trans- 
portation, economies of srale and of capital needs. For the present, 
Chinese leaders are committed to this policy. In visits to smaller urban 
areas, thev emphasize the capacity of an area, for example Chengtu 
and Kweilin. to be productive cities rather than consumptive cities. In 
the visits to smaller as well as larger factories they reiterated the con- 
tribution of both to the building of a =orialist society. 

We saw numerous examples of this dual development. This report 
has mentioned elsewhere the factories found in the agricultural sites. 
In our visit to the West Changan Neighborhood Association — dis- 
cussed later in this report — we were told that some women (working 
on a piece rate at home) provided articles subcontracted from Peking 


factories. The Shanghai electrical machinery factory, which some 
members of the delegation visited, was a large-scale factory, the textile 
factory in Kweilin was not and deserves close attention. 

The Kweilin silk spinning factory is located on the outskirts of one 
of the most famous cities in China. Traditionally known as a resort 
site with remarkably beautiful scenery, Kweilin now includes a sub- 
stantial industrial capacity while still remaining a resort area. The 
factory we visited was one example of this. The factory — commissioned 
in 1968 during the cultural revolution — included spinning, loom, and 
silk printing machinery, all of which had been produced in China and 
installed by the staff and workers of the factory. The seven workshops 
in the factory together produced pongee silk, cotton, a cotton-silk 
mix, some synthetic fibers and pure silk for the covers of quilts. Of 
the 2,400 staff members and workers approximately 65 percent were 
women and of the cadres in the factory some 40 percent were women. 

The factory ran round the clock with three shifts per day and work- 
ers rotated from week to week among the shifts. The output of the 
factory has increased enormously since 1970. We did not receive abso- 
lute figures, but were limited to percentage increases. In 1975 the 
factory produced more than 4 times the output of 5 years earlier 
(1969). The capacity to produce different products had increased from 
17 items in 1970 to 42 items in 1975. At the same time efforts had been 
successful to increase quality control and through technical innova- 
tions to reduce labor intensity. Some examples were given to us. The 
machine developed in the factory had reduced the need for 21 workers ; 
in the weaving workshop they had installed electric chairs (which we 
saw) which reduced the burdens on each worker and yet left the indi- 
vidual free to be able to handle more looms. 

The factory wages were relatively low but the benefits which 
accompanied them substantial. The average income was 50-yuan a 
month with a low of 40 and a high of 80 yuan. Though there had been 
modest increases in the factory minimum over the past 6 j^ears, appar- 
ently no increase had occurred for those at the top grade of 80 yuan. 
This information confirmed other indications of Chinese efforts to 
reduce the discrepancy between workers' salaries. When asked about 
the need for incentives to insure high level production and quality 
control, our hosts told us that they relied upon the workers under- 
standing their role and contribution to the building of a Communist 

This factory provided the full range of welfare benefits and services. 
Some housing was available in the factory, specifically dormitories 
for the unmarried and apparently some minimal housing for married 
couples though most married women lived in the nearby city. Prenatal 
examinations for pregnant women were provided from the seventh 
month with options for reduced work by assignment to lighter tasks, 
and provisions for nursing mothers to continue feeding their infants. 
The factory ran a primary school, and provided nurseries for infants 
over 56 days of age as well as kindergarten for the preschoolers. Medi- 
cal facilities were available. 

The factory, governed by a revolutionary committee under the direc- 
tion of the city of Kweilin. from whom it received production targets, 
had been successful, however, in constantly exceeding its quotas. In 
addition to the administrative operations of the revolutionary com- 


mittee there was also an active trade union responsible for the educa- 
tion and welfare of the workers. Trade union dues were 30 cents per 
month deducted from the salaries of the workers. We were not able to 
learn about the mobility within the factory, that is, the promotion of 
workers to staff, or cadres, but our hosts reported that turnover was 
exceedingly low. When asked, the union leaders told us that they 
never raised questions concerning wages or workloads. 

Eevolutioxary Education 

Whether or not the Chinese Communist leadership will be able to 
continue the momentum found in agriculture and industry without 
resorting to the incentive systems common to most. non-Communist 
societies and indeed in other socialist systems depends in very large 
measure upon Chinese effectiveness in instilling and maintaining 1 evo- 
lutionary values in their citizenry. Consequently, education in China 
is exceedingly important and cannot be divorced from the politics of 
the society. In fact, political indoctrination is not only a major com- 
ponent but essentially a goal of all Chinese education. In the light of 
these assumptions, two statements of Chairman Mao are worth noting. 
"Education must serve proletarian politics and be combined with 
productive labour" and "Our educational policy must enable every- 
one who receives an education to develop morally, intellectually, and 
physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousness and 

Since 1949 the Chinese have developed education on an immense 
scale. By 1975 the number of university, middle school, and primary 
school students was more than one-fifth of the total population. Assum- 
ing only 800 million people, that means 160 million pupils. The need 
for schools, textbooks, and teachers to serve this student body is enor- 
mous and. given the population pyramid, will grow before it begins 
to level off. Chinese efforts are not limited to the conventional uni- 
versities, colleges, and middle and primary schools but include a 
variety of workers' colleges run by factories, peasant colleges run by 
communes, short term courses administered through universities and 
factories, correspondence courses, vocational schools, part-work part- 
study schools and technical schools for the rural population. 

Beyond the school itself, a wide range of organizations are involved 
in education. In addition to schools run by the state, many of the pri- 
mary schools are run by and financed by rural communes and some 
brigades. Classes are designed to take advantage of local conditions. 
We were informed that there are mobile schools that move between 
remote villages, or 'pastoral schools for herdsmen. Education is not 
confined to the schools. As we discovered on our trip, workers, peasants, 
officeworkers. the army men. clerks and people in city neighborhoods 
spend part of their spare time in small groups studying newspapers, 
learning foreign languages, or participating in other on-the-job train- 
ing programs. Consequently it is difficult to generalize about the 

On the other hand, the emphasis on education was one of the im- 
portant aspects of contemporary life in China that our hosts wished 
to highlight for us. By arranging for us to visit a primary school, a 


middle school, and a college, together with kindergartens and iiui'mt- 
ies, where education begins, plus the constant references in brieiings 
to the education*] revolution in China, which they date from the 
cultural revolution, we have been able to observe a fairly broad cross 
section of Chinese etl'orts. 

It is essential to an understanding of eduction in China that one 
recognize the broadscale Betting in which it occurs. Thus, the b 
casting stations, the local newspapers, together with study groups : all 
are designed to integrate politics and education. The afterschool activ- 
ities conducted in the cities and neighborhood associations, the skills 
imparted, the social messages implicitly and explicitly conveyed con- 
stitute a massive effort to insure the continued participation of China's 
youth in a revolution that most of them, some 27 years after the end 
of the civil war, have not directly experienced. 

This report on education includes observations on a discrete series 
of institutions and concludes with some general observations on char- 
acteristics of the system. The need to describe one institution at a 
time should not overshadow the constant emphasis on integrating 
social values throughout the system, which is a hallmark of the 
Chinese experience. 


Beyond the creches which serve to care for the children of employed 
parents and are available as early as 56 days after birth, the nurseries 
and kindergartens of China begin the indoctrination process as well as 
imparting skills and knowledge necessary for life in China. As we ob- 
served in the nursery and kindergarten facilities of Peng-pu commune 
children are grouped in classes by age with the normal grouping re- 
flecting each 6-month cohort. The facilities and equipment in most of 
these nurseries and kindergartens are rather sparse by American stand- 
ards except for those in large industrial settings. The emphasis when 
the children are old enough is upon development of cooperative social 
patterns, mutual aid and help, some familiarity with the national lan- 
guage (many of the children may speak the local dialect at home) 
and the learning of songs, dances, and some simple games designed to 
enhance physical well-being and coordination. One of the songs we 
heard referred to "our brothers in Taiwan." others to Chairman Mao 
and the beauty of cooperation. 

Primary school facilities differ widely. As in the United States, 
urban schools based upon the neighborhood pattern — often built be- 
fore 1940 — are likely to be larger and have more varied courses. Text- 
books are more abundant, equipment better and more diverse. In the 
Chengtu brigade we visited, facilities were simple and limited. Cer- 
tain problems confront the rural education system. One difficulty arises 
from living patterns. Villages on a production team are small — fre- 
quentlv 2b-30 families — and therefore the population is often insuffi- 
cient for a school. Lacking transportation, small children may have a 
considerable distance to walk. During winter this undoubtedly influ- 
ences attendance. In the Shanghai commune, we learned that schools 
were assigned on the basis of the home locations without regard to 
whether or not the school was managed bv the commune in which the 
parents worked. Such patterns are familiar to Americans. Still, dis- 


tance is a major difficulty for the young and undoubtedly is a problem 
in the more remote areas which we did not visit. 

As early as preschool, the emphasis on combining education with pro- 
duction becomes apparent. We were told that in urban schools there 
may be a small school garden to impress upon the voungster the impor- 
tance of agriculture; there is alwavs a short work period for the 
younger students to do simple tasks such as packing flashlight bulbs to 
acquaint them with the importance of labor. Through lectures and 
stories told to children by retired workers and peasants, the young 
pupils learn of the value of work. The emphasis is more pronounced at 
the middle school, where students are older. 


Students in China begin middle school at approximately 12 years of 
age, equivalent to American junior high students. This is because pri- 
mary school, started at 7, is generally 5 years in duration, though some 
variation apparently exists. Middle school may vary between 4- and 5- 
year curriculums with 2 years considered "lower middle school" and 2 
to 3 years "upper." Some graduate after only the "lower course" ; this 
is particularly true in the countryside with its limited facilities. 

It is at the middle school level that the Chinese "open door" policy 
is made a key element of education. In the United States an "open 
door" policy is most commonly assumed to refer to admissions and 
most frequently used in terms of college and university admissions. 
In China, the "open door" policy refers to the close integration be- 
tween theory and practical experience and refers to the need to con- 
sider the whole world as one's school. Thus in middle schools, students 
are expected not only to complete the regular course of study but also 
to participate in productive labor. Depending upon the location of the 
middle school, the economic conditions of the managing institution 
and a variety of other factors, such as distance, the school activities, 
the inclass projects, and the afterschool programs will be designed to 
reinforce this close relationship between education and productive 
labor. In theoretical terms this policy is designed to prevent the emer- 
gence of an elite intellectual class unable and more importantly un- 
willing to participate in the difficult labor necessary to build a Com- 
munist China. 

Beyond this important theoretical justification, the maintenance of 
the rural-urban ratio in China requires that the students in the city 
be able to participate in agricultural activities and that countryside 
pupils develop skills that will fit them for a lifetime — if not as 
peasants then as skilled technicians, accountants, or cadres in the 

It is this aspect of education in China continued into university 
life which is the most controversial and the most interesting. We 
observed, for example, in the No. 1 Middle School in Shanghai, affili- 
ated with the Shanghai Teachers Training College, students engaged 
in practicing acupuncture on patients from the city population, pre- 
paring them to serve in the countryside as "barefoot doctors" (that is, 
limited trained medical workers able to provide first level medical 
care to China's rural population) . In middle school classes, our hosts 
told us, courses in mathematics and sciences draw upon rural condi- 
tions and examples for the learning of scientific formulas and mathe- 


matical procedures. As in American society, certain values are 
implicit in textbook examples. In Chinese schools the politics of the 
society are integrated wherever possible into the examples of class- 
room study. Quotations and writing of Chairman Mao Tse-tung were 
standard texts for middle school students in Chinese language and 
grammar classes. Depending upon location, middle schools have 
developed small factories designed to provide some training for their 
st udents as well as practical evidence of the need to combine education 
and productive labor. While participation in productive labor may be 
limited to one period a week for the smaller children in primary 
schools, the requirement is more substantial in middle schools either 
on a daily basis or a week or two assignment in a factory. In addition, 
we saw middle school students in Shanghai preparing to go to the 
countryside for short periods of work. Our guides told us that by 
working in the countryside, living in peasant homes, and cooking 
their own meals, these students would learn about the reality and 
importance of labor for China rather than consider it as a remote 
fact of economic life. 

In addition to the formal school setting, some urban children have 
access to the so-called "children's palaces" where they have the oppor- 
1 unity to participate in extracurricular activities and recreation. In 
Shanghai there are 10 such facilities spread about the city. The one 
we visited, called Pu-tuo District Children's Palace, was built in 1960 
and provided services to 1,500 children a day between the ages of 
7 to 12 years. Children were selected by the schools in this district 
on a rotational basis and were supposed to return to their schools and 
teach their classmates. We were told that the children were selected 
on the basis of politics and talent, but we did not discover the rela- 
tive weight of the two factors nor how politics is judged for children 
under 12. When discussing this matter with one guide, the suggestion 
was made that perhaps politics might be reflected in the conduct of 
the child in his school. 

The children performed for us and told us about their activities. 
The classes covered such activities as dance, music, with the develop- 
ment of children's orchestras as well as teaching of piano and accor- 
dion, ship and airplane-model building, the construction of radios, 
physical education, and theater skits. The quality of performance was 
uniformly high and the children showed a consistently high sense 
of self-confidence and comfort in meeting with us. The content of the 
performances reflected the values of the society. For example, a ping- 
pong ballet had the theme of "Friendship First, Competition Second." 
A song and dance performance entitled "Moving the Boulder" 
showed individuals alone failing in a task but when they worked 
together succeeding. Another performance of a Taiwan dance was 
one of the few overt references to the unended civil war. The students 
also told us that they were writing to their big brothers and sisters 
who were working in the countryside giving them encouragement 
for their revolutionary contribution. 

Thus in classroom, productive labor, and after school activities, 
the education system of the People's Republic reinforced values 
that would prepare students for work in the countryside and perhaps 
a lifetime there. 



At the college level, the consequence of the integration of political 
values and education is most clear and most controversial. This is true 
not only for us as visitors to China but also apparently for the Chinese 
themselves who are still engaged in reassessment of changes that have 
been brought about in higher education. 

Supporters of the current Chinese higher education policies will 
explain the changes of the last decade in the following manner. Though 
education in universities and colleges had expanded and changed to 
some extent, prior to the 1966 cultural revolution, education, through- 
out China but particularly at the upper levels had — according to the 
Communist theoiw — become too specialized, elitist, emphasizing only 
theory, and remote from the practical life of the people of China. 
Students would spend 16 to 20 years in educational institutions and 
yet be unable to participate in the general life of the society. Even 
more dangerous in the view of Chairman Mao was the development 
of a separation between mental and physical labor. The cause of this 
problem in education is laid at the door of revisionists in Chinese 
society who had strayed from the appropriate path. These so-called 
"capitalist roaders" had seized power prior to 1966. 

Between 1966-69 Chinese higher education — as well as middle and 
lower schools — went through some profound changes. Universities 
and colleges were closed for 3 years while curricula were changed, and 
admission procedures altered to rely primarily upon the recommenda- 
tions of the Communist Party Committees with few if any examina- 
tions. Today middle school graduates must work for a minimum of 2 
years in the countryside or factories before they may be considered 
for university attendance. The student presents himself, he must be 
endorsed by the members of his work unit, approved by the higher 
party level and his name will then be forwarded to certain colleges for 
special courses of study based upon the needs of the state as well as 
the listed choices of the student. By late fall of 1975, some Chinese 
universities had developed informal examinations, others had imposed 
more formal tests for admissions, largely on the basis of dissatisfaction 
with the academic level of students. The issue of the appropriateness 
of entrance examinations and the role of examinations, as well as 
graduate training had become a controversial topic in China prior to 
our arrival. Posters criticizing the Minister of Education had ap- 
peared on college campuses and lines were being drawn over the issue 
of political substance versus problems of academic quality. The delega- 
tion therefore wished to visit an institution of higher education and 
observe this problem- at first hand. 

Although we were refused permission to visit the Peking University, 
the opportunity was afforded us to spend a morning session at the 
Central Institute of the ^Nationalities (a college designed to train 
national minority cadres). Since 1951 this institute has trained more 
than 10.000 individuals in various fields. The courses of study were,. 

(1) politics — designed for cadres of the various non-Han nationali- 
ties who needed work in the political theory of Marx-Lenin/Mao Tse- 
tung thought prior to returning for work at the grassroots level: 

(2) language training in the translation and interpreting of various 


minorities' languages including such languages as Korean, Manchu, 
and Uighur; (3) Han language, that is, the national language of 
China; (4) history — the history and traditions of China as well as 
various national minorities; (5) art, music, dance and fine arts; and 
(6) cadre training. In addition to these courses of study there was 
also a variety of 1- or 2-year cultural courses for students from the 
national minorities areas to raise their cultural level before they could 
study in other Chinese universities and medical schools. 

The current student body was comprised of 1.700 students from 4G 
nationalities, border areas and regions. The full course was normally 
3 years of study, cadre training was 1 year and the dance and line arts 
category required 4 years. In addition, in the previous year, some 8.000 
students had participated in short-term courses, generally less than a 
year in duration. 

The library at the institute had only Albanian. Vietnamese and 
Czech newspapers, and the only magazine available was a Chinese 
publication translated into various languages. There is a good supply 
of Western musical scores and art books, including an excellent, but 
very old, encyclopedia of art o,f the world. 

The chairman of the National Minorities Institute emphasized the 
changes in the education system since the cultural revolution. He 
summarized the change in admission and confirmed that instead of the 
old exams, enrollment came from workers and peasants in the various 
areas with the recommendation of the units and the approval of the 
higher authority. In addition to changes in admission there have been 
changes within the institute. Classes are now combined with periods 
of work in the countryside, emphasizing the "open door" policy. In 
addition, relations between the students and teachers have changed 
in the direction of a greater equality rather than the sharp division 
between those who taught and those who studied. 

Mr. Li, chairman of the revolutionary committee of the institute, 
acknowledged that differences still existed with some who believed 
that the quality of education was too low. He agreed that the system 
itself was still undergoing change. 

In the course of an extended discussion period about changes in the 
institute, Mr. Li explained that the percentage of women had increased 
among the students up to the present level of 30 percent. He discussed 
the placement of graduates in some detail, indicating that in principle 
individuals should return to the places from which they came. How- 
ever, now they were assigned by a local committee and some were sent 
to responsible positions utilizing the skills learned in the institute 
while others returned home. The ages of students varied, those coming 
for the cadre training course were often in their forties and fifties. 
those in the regular course in the early twenties, and those for train- 
ing in the fine arts, dancing, et cetera as young as 11 and 12. 

A conversation ensued over the problem of the brilliant student, 
particularly gifted in one area, but without special interest in politics. 
Mr. Li denied the existence of "gifted students" but when pressed 
agreed that some were "quick." Also, he denied the value of abstract 
thinking without recourse to the reality of life and indicated that 
with respect to such a student the school would make extra effort to 
enhance the student's political awareness to match his special abilities. 

78-097—76 5 


In an assessment of such awareness, the manifestation and imple- 
mentation of political consciousness are deemed important, for they 
are the qualities which make such awareness apparent. 


To this point we have discussed educational institutions within 
the conventional framework of primary, middle, and university. Be- 
yond that system there remains the schools that have emerged since 
the cultural revolution to provide reinforcement of political aware- 
ness together with physical labor for those individuals who by pro- 
fession or assignment are required to engage in mental effort remote 
from physical labor. A product of the cultural revolution, the May 
7th cadre school is designed to reinforce and renew commitment to 
political ideology together with requiring physical labor for Chinese 
cadres and administrators. The close intermingling of political study 
with physical labor for extended periods of time in austere conditions 
away from one's family and without regard to the special skills of 
participants raises important questions of human resource utilization. 
The delegation was pleased to have the opportunity to visit such a 
school and to raise some questions about its operation with the students 
and staff. 

The term "May 7th" cadre school is drawn from a statement of 
Chairman Mao published on May 7, 1968, calling for the development 
of a new type school. The institution we visited was called the Chung 
Wen district May 7th cadre school. Established in October 1968, it is 
now 7 years old. The students who attend it are apparently all drawn 
from the Chung Wen suburb of the city of Peking. Since its initiation, 
some 3,800 men and women have completed the course of study. The 
current term is 6 months. It appears, however, that the length of 
study in a May 7th school may vary. In the first few years after 
establishment, lacking experience and perhaps with a different politi- 
cal climate, the terms were longer. Some of our guides indicated that 
they had spent 1 or 2 years in other May 7th schools. In the late 1960's 
the schools were also less formally organized, with facilities often 
limited to a few buildings. The students lived for the duration of 
their study in local peasant homes. This latter condition apparently 
caused some social difficulties. By the mid-1970's schools have separate 

Chung Wen's students came from the nearby area, and were drawn 
largely from people who might be classified as teachers and white 
collar workers, such as the chairman and vice chairman of shops, 
schools and administrative organizations in Chung Wen district to- 
gether with teachers from middle and primary schools. Pupils would 
be in school for 6 months with the opportunity to return home for 
visits once or twice a month. When we visited the student body was 
composed of 250 individuals of whom 50 percent were women, vary- 
ing in age from the early twenties, into the fifties. Most we met were 
apparently in their middle twenties or early thirties. One woman 
teacher proudly told us, however, that she was in her forties and had 
to persuade her school that her age and health should not constitute 
a barrier to attendance. This suggested that physical conditions and 
other factors may play a role in final assignment. 


Our hosts told us that selection for the school was a somewhat 
complicated matter. In general, each cadre ought to take a turn, once 
every 5 years, but the various constituent organizations made their 
selection on the basis of their own needs. The students with whom 
we spoke had all volunteered but we do not know whether or not this 
is true for all. In general, we were told about 50 percent of the students 
wore Communist Party members or members of the Young Com- 
munist League, the remaining were nonparty individuals. Though 
militia members — normally part-time — might well be in attendance, 
no Army personnel were included. We were told that there are sep- 
arate schools for the military, with perhaps different curricula 
and work. While in attendance at the school, the individual's pay 
remains the same as when he or she was working in his or her unit, 
hence there was no hardship for their families. We were told that 
most were married. 

The district party organization governed Chung Wen through the 
party committee of the school. Presumably their supervision was 
general in nature and perhaps focused upon the substantive topics 
studied, since the May 7th school revolutionary committee was re- 
sponsible for administration. Throughout the school, emphasis was 
upon cooperation between the teachers and students and extensive 
use of self-study for much of the work. 

The curriculum used important documents in the history of the 
party together with current event materials. Thus the emphasis in 
1975 was upon a close study of "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat" ; 
in 197-i they had emphasized Lenin's "On Imperialism." "The Gotha 
Programme" and "Anti-Duehring." When we visited the students, 
they were working on the January 1 editorials of the Chinese press 
together with January 1 poems of Chairman Mao. We asked them 
how long they might focus upon these materials and they responded 
that the work might be expected to last 6 to 8 weeks. 

Political study of Marxism-Leninism and a reviewing of the con- 
tribution of Chairman Mao as well as current events was only one-half 
the emphasis in a May 7 school. The other half, equally impor- 
tant, we were told, was physical labor together with establishing a 
deep understanding of the needs and work techniques of the peasants 
and workers of China. The second part of the May 7 emphasis was 
accomplished by a rigorous program of physical labor on the part 
of all students coupled with trips to the villages to learn from the 
peasants, hear stories from the older peasants, and in the course of 
a 3-week period spent living with peasants in the villages, reaffirm 
for the cadre the importai^.ce of serving the people, heart and soul. 
Each was expected to take part in the heavy physical labor associated 
with the school's agricultural activities. Through such work, the 
school expected to enhance the political understanding of the indi- 
viduals, and narrow the problems between city and countryside, 
worker and peasant, and labor and intellectual labor. 

Throughout their stay in the school, students were expected con- 
stantly to review their development and, upon completion of their 
stay, to write an extended summary of their experience. This report 
would be read by members of the party committee of the school. Our 
hosts emphasized that attendance in the school was neither to 
serve as a means for higher position, nor for membership in the party. 


The daily schedule of the students varied with the season. While 
in summer the work began earlier, in winter the schedule was as 
follows : 

6 :30- 7 :30 Rise, P.E., and exercise, cleanup of living area. 

7 :30- 8 :00 Breakfast. 

8:00-12:00 Study or labor. 

12:00- 1:30 Lunch and rest. 

1 :30- 5 :00 Labor and/or study. 

5 :30- 7 :00 Dinner. 

7 :00- 9 :00 Conference, study, meeting, or recreation. 

9 :00 Sleep. 

The school we visited was spartan in its makeup. We visited students 
in their dormitories, which also served as a place of study. They were 
simply constructed with 12 individuals in a single room. Other build- 
ings contained a mess hall, meeting place. There were simple recre- 
ational facilities such as a basketball court. Apparently singing and 
theatrical performances are encouraged because we were entertained 
by a lively singing group of students. 

Questions about the operation of May 7 schools remained. In 
addition to schools based upon districts, others are apparently jointly 
sponsored by administrative units in the government. While the stu- 
dents at Chung Wen could return home every 2 weeks, cadre schools 
located in more remote areas distant from the homes of their students 
obviously imposed more of a hardship. Within the school, there 
seemed to be an easy relationship amoncr the students. We were told 
that the school had achieved a general equality between men and 
women. They said, however, that men were not too adept at washing 
things and women helped. On the other hand, no man in the school 
served tea, suggesting that some roles still remained stereotyped. 

Beyond the formal schooling possibilities we have described, there 
were other institutions in China which played an educational role. 
Television sets are increasingly seen in Chinese cities. Besides the inte- 
gration of political values into the entertainment medium through 
movies, singing, news reporting, and television, the medium serves 
straight educational purposes. For example. English and Japanese 
are now taught on radio and television and numerous Chinese are 
working hard to learn these foreign languages. 

In P'eng-pu oommune we visited a radio broadcasting facility. 
First established in 1958, with apparent updating of equipment 
since then, this station was connected to all loud speakers in the com- 
mune. National news was relayed from Peking at set times. Young- 
sters were encouraged to develop skits or programs for general listen- 
ing according to a broadcast schedule. Announcements and music 
were also part of its output. The local papers as well as the People's 
Daily are very inexpensive (0.035 cents per copy) and serve to indicate 
leadership priorities for the readers. Though we saw only a few films, 
they served not only to show Chinese achievements to their popula- 
tion bnt also to fulfill an educational purpose. 

We wore impressed by the magnitude of the task that has con- 
fronted the Chinese in their efforts to provide educational opportuni- 
ties to their population. Their resourcefulness in developing schools, 
providing materials, and integrating the primary and middle schools 
into loral structures not only for direction but also for financing had 

many attractive aspects. Their oiTorts to avoid a large intellectual 
elite that is unemployed haw obvious advantages to the leadership, 

particularly where they seek to raise city and countryside standards 
of living together. Clearly middle school graduates can make impor- 
tant contributions to their country's development. 

The social and economic costs of this program may be high, depend- 
ing on how thoroughly its policies are carried out. Students we met 
did not indicate any personal preferences in response to queries about 
their interests or hopes for future careers. Beyond a lew generaliza- 
tions, we learned little about the allocation of university students to 
special programs. The system as presently operative docs not seek out 
the specially gifted intellectual who may only be interested in mathe- 
matics or science; indeed, such a student would face strong pre lire 
to change his viewpoint. Though there are obvious advantages to 
requiring students to spend at least 2 years in the countryside before 
even applying for university training, this 2-year intermission cou- 
pled with the shortened course of study must inevitably have some 
consequences for the quality of training of university and graduate 
students who will be needed as China develops. There are very practi- 
cal consequences of such a policy in such areas as advanced agricul- 
tural research and the development of high technology capabilities. 

While the May 7 cadre schools may be realistic in terms of Chi- 
nese internal political priorities, they, too, pose dilemmas. If the 
program is carried out as we saw it at Chung Wen, then the yearly 
loss of special contributions by doctors, engineers, and scientists must 
be high. If these individuals in fact do not participate in the May 7 
experience, then elitism remains. 

Organizing People 

It was readily apparent that social control on a large scale and in 
minute particulars was essential to bring about the modernization of 
China along the political lines of the Chinese leaders. Since all o^ the 
institutions we visited emphasized the need for community self- 
reliance, understanding of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and rejected material incentives as a means 
for insuring support and enthusiasms for difficult tasks, the emphasis 
had to be upon education and organization for the acceptance of 
policies. [Though material differences do remain between peasants, 
and within factories, our guides and those who briefed us emphasized 
that these material differences should eventually be eliminated and 
continually minimized.] 

The means for insuring a high degree of social organization and 
support are through the institutions of the state and mass organiza- 
tions under the leadership of the party. While the party and the state 
and army may dominate the Chinese political system, determine policy 
alternatives and the means for their implementation, there are a 
variety of organizations which provide links to the vast number of 
China's citizens outside the elite. [These institutions support and pro- 
vide means for supplementing the dominant institutions. Some of 
these organizations are associated with residence patterns and the 
others are called mass organizations, of which the Women's Federa- 
tion is an example.] 


During our visit we visited and toured a neighborhood residence 
association and had an extended briefing by the vice chairman of 
the Peking Municipal Women's Federation. These two experiences 
provide an example of how the system works. 


The West Changan Neighborhood Association is a governmental 
organization covering about 1.5 kilometers of the city. It is composed 
of 20,000 households with a total population of about 80.000 indi- 
viduals, including 14 primary schools, 7 kindergartens, 800 teachers 
and staff and some 10,000 students. It is managed by 12 revolutionary 

The West Changan Neighborhood Association is a governmental 
organization below the Peking municipal committee, county, and 
district committees. The neighborhood office workers — cadres — are 
assigned by the government and paid by the government, On the other 
hand, the residence committee is drawn from the residents, work is 
voluntary and represents, we were told, self-government in the urban 
areas. Each residence committee is responsible for approximately 
600 households, equal to about 2.400 individuals. The residence stand- 
ing committee was composed of 15 members with a chairman and 
two vice chairmen. In the specific residence committee we visited, one 
member of the committee was a retired worker and all the rest were 
housewives over 40. Most young women were full-time workers in 
factories, shops, and government units, where their responsibilities to 
their units did not permit them to participate in the activities of the 
local residential area. Thus, the committee was largely made up of 
women over 40 3 r ears of age. 

The selection of membership follows a pattern observed elsewhere. 
A tentative list of names is agreed upon and then forwarded for 
approval to the next higher political authority. Approval was on the 
basis of enthusiasm and activism. We could not find out why a name 
might be rejected nor how often such rejection occurs. 

While the committees had existed for some time, we were told that 
before the cultural revolution they had no office space and their 
activities were more limited than is the case today. In general terms 
the work of the committee was (1) to organize study groups, (2) to 
insure that each small "alley*' or courtyard group — oldstyle housing 
in Peking revolved around courtyards; after 1949, the large houses 
were divided into smaller living units but the courtyard still remains 
the focus of those living in the house itself — hence the term courtyard 
association which may have 100 or 200 members — supervised children 
in the absence of * working parents, and (3) to develop means for 
enhancing the livelihood of those living in the area. 

These goals were translated into some interesting activities. For 
example, we observed a group engaged in Chinese silk painting sub- 
contracted from a factory, a service center, a medical station and a 
sewing center, and a nursery. We were told that some piecework assign- 
ments were scattered throughout the area for those who needed to work 
at home. All these activities were supervised and coordinated by the 
residence committee. 


Beyond these programs, the committee was responsible for periodic 
area cleanup and for insuring public health activities to prevent infec- 
tious diseases. 

In observing these activities, we found that the women working were 
also middle-aged and older persons who supplemented their income by 
what was considered "part-time" employment. It appeared, however, 
that the hours spent on their work approached full time. Volunteer 
women in the area, together with medical workers, coordinated family 
planning activities. Our guides told us that the committee and its 
volunteers worked closely with the health stations to make certain that 
those women in the ehildbearing ages received full information about 
the desirability of small families and the advantages it offered to the 
couple. In addition, birth control pills were dispensed from these same 
health stations. "While sterilization and abortions were possible, it 
seemed that primary reliance was placed upon the pill. The neighbor- 
hood committee also had an office that was responsible for security 
and such militia activities as were organized in the area. It appeared 
that while the residence committee had general responsibility, the 
neighborhood association was the governmental unit involved in co- 
ordinating militia activities. 

Much of the housing in the area we visited was old. We were told 
that government committees existed to assign housing, particularly the 
new facilities being built, with government decisions made on the basis 
of the size of the family and its particular conditions. But our hosts 
told us that some informal trading occurred. "We learned elsewhere 
that in some cities, couples who married at the ages recommended, 
namely, 23-24 for women and 25-26 for men, rather than at the legal 
ages of 18 for women and 20 for men, received some priority for hous- 
ing assignments. 

We asked about the resolution of differing views within the com- 
mittees. Our guides told us that differences did occur from time to time. 
In those cases each side could state their case to a higher authority 
but. we were told that "the minority is always persuaded." 

We asked about the problems the committee had confronted over 
the history of its development. Initially, there was reluctance on the 
part of individuals to involve themselves in political study, to partici- 
pate in group cleanup efforts and also to practice family planning. 
Over the years the residence committee has stressed these activities. 
Group study sessions were organized to explain the importance of 
cleanup efforts, or the advantages of family planning for the health of 
the conple. and their work. Undoubtedly, as years passed, Chinese 
women and men came to understand the expectation of their partici- 
pation in political study. 

The organization of the neighborhood association together with the 
residence committee provides Chinese leadership with the means to 
reach those individuals in Chinese cities not employed in factories and 
administrative units and shops. In addition, it provides a mechanism 
for insuring positive social support for government policies many of 
which are genuinely popular. We noted, for example, that the residence 
committee through close overseeing of the courtyards could make 
certain of the safety of children returning home after school, or could 
insure that health policies were carried out. The committees provided 


useful and meaningful employment to retired and older citizens. It 
undoubtedly also serves to allow potential leaders to gain some experi- . 
ence in smaller units before they are moved into larger responsibilities. 
At the same time, the effective residence committees must curtail the 
privacy possible for individuals in the area. Effective operation re- 
quires a thorough knowledge of the work and activities of the citizens 
for whom they are responsible. The sphere of individual or family 
responsibility shrinks. Election to the leadership of these committees 
is by acclaim or consensus — no secret balloting takes place. 


There are also a large number of associations that maintain contact 
with primary citizens' groups as well as with the national political 
elite. In general these mass organizations are national in scale with a 
table of organization from the central level down to a mass member- 
ship. They are defined by some social or economic characteristic, as for 
example workers for the trade unions or women for the All China 
Women's Federation. In Communist systems they can serve to make 
the needs and wishes of their members known to the leadership and 
make the leadership decisions known to their membership. These or- 
ganizations are generally open to all who share the characteristic of 
membership, thus enhancing the likelihood of mass contact. In addi- 
tion, they have local, intermediate, and national officers and repre- 
sentative bodies. A number of these organizations were suspended 
from activities during the course of the Cultural Revolution, in part 
because they were accused of overly stressing the interests of their 
members. In the 1970's, however, the women's federation has received 
considerable attention in part because of its obvious role in enhancing 
the role of women in China. 

The delegation met with Madam Hsu Kuang, vice chairman of the 
Peking Women's Federation, for an extended discussion about the 
changes in the position and role of women since 1949. Not only did we 
learn about Chinese efforts and programs to utilize women more fully 
in their society, but also about the women's federation's views of 
Chinese women with respect to achievements and organization. In 
addition to our discussions with Madam Hsu, we met representatives 
of the women's federation at virtually every point on our trip — at 
communes, factories, meetings, hospitals, and schools — giving us the 
opportunity to see "on the spot" development. 

Chinese problems and achievements in this area of social change 
mirror efforts with respect to many other groups. They demonstrate 
the close relationship between party leadership, government policies, 
and self-education and change initiated by women themselves. 

To enhance roles for women, emphasis is upon the close relationship 
between politics and social policy. At one point in our discussion a 
question was raised on this specific point. One member of the delega- 
tion noted that in the International Women's Year meeting in Mexico 
City political issues had seemed to prevent close cooperation among 
women of the world. Madam Hsu noted that the Chinese believe that 
women's problems are related to politics, class, and nationality, and 
this linkage remained clear throughout all our discussions. 


The, Chinese say that women today under the leadership of Chair- 
man Mao and the Chinese Communist Party enjoy equality with men 
and "have risen from being slaves to being masters of their own 
country" and playing an important role in building new China. Theiy 
note that Chairman Mao had said that when women rose up, the revo- 
lution would succeed and they had done so throughout the history of 
the party. In the long march, as members of the historic Eighth Route 
Army, in the guerrilla operations during the Sino-Japanese War and 
today in the Chinese People's Liberation Army, women have made a 
great contribution, 

According to Madam ITsu. in the old society Chinese women were 
not only oppressed by imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic cap- 
it alism but in addition by the authority of politics, of the clan, of re- 
ligion and of their husbands. Women were exploited economically, had 
no right to read or to be educated (90 percent were illiterate), were 
disi riminated against in Chinese philosophy (particularly by Con- 
fucius and Mencius), had no right to their own names nor to choose 
the man they married. 

Since 1049, in the view of t he Chinese women we met, there have been 
substantial changes, partially as a result of Chinese political policies 
and partially as a result of social emphasis within the country. This 
has been a two-pronged policy, namely specific Chinese laws coupled 
with special measures for the protection of the health, well-being and 
training of Chinese women. 

The fundamental legislative changes that established equality in 
post 1949 China were the 1951 marriage laws that insisted on the free 
right of individuals to choose their spouses, established equal rights 
for both partners in the care of children, and women's use of their own 
names, together with monogamous marriage and equal rights to div- 
orce. In addition, the labor insurance legislation and labor protection 
provisions provided safeguards for women in terms of maternity leave, 
conditions of employment, and provisions for child care and retire- 
ment benefits. Together with these major changes in law and the 
Chinese constitutional provision for equality for women, certain less 
formal developments had also lessened the problems of women. Thus 
the development of primary and middle schools, plus the increasing 
availabilit}^ of jobs, together with the party's insistence on the hiring 
of women, had provided opportunities for literacy and employment. 
Though many of these programs existed before the cultural revo- 
lution, in its aftermath, emphasis has been placed on increasing the 
number of women with special skills such as doctors, and increasing 
the number of women in politically responsible positions. 

These efforts have already begun to bear fruit. There were a number 
of examples cited to show the increasing role that women now play in 
China. In important political positions the number of women has been 
increasing. In the Politburo of the Communist Party there are now 
two women. Tn the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) one 
first vice premier and three vice chairmen are women. There are more 
women on the standing; committee of the NPC. Of its 141 members, 42 
are women. Tn the NPC itself, the percentages of women have been 
increasing: in the First XPC 10 percent. Second NPC 14 percent. 
Third NPC 18 percent, and Fourth NPC 22 percent. In the State 


Council (the chief administrative organ) there are now two ministers 
(public health and hydraulic engineering). 

Below the national level, at the provincial and municipal levels r 
the number of women leaders (as well as minorities) is increasing. In 
the Peking Revolutionary Committee there are three women vice chair- 
men, and where women in precultural revolution days constituted 
25 percent of the cadres they are now 38 percent. In the judiciary in 
the highest court there was one vice justice who was a woman and 
seven women in the middle court. 

In addition to the Government, changes were also taking place in 
other employment areas. More women are now teaching in primary 
and middle schools and changes are occurring at the university level 
as well. Currently 60 percent of the doctors are women, though fewer 
senior doctors are women. Fifty percent of medical students are 
women and 40 percent of the students at Peking university are women. 

Beyond these indications of increasing employment success, the 
emphasis in China has been upon changing some of the conditions 
which limited women's participation and changing some of the re- 
maining inequitable economic conditions. Thus, we were told the op- 
portunities for schooling have increased, and in most places women 
now receive equal pay for equal work, though some problems remain 
in the countryside. 

In addition to educational opportunities, the possibility of bringing - 
more women into productive labor rests upon providing opportunities 
for child care, for basic reading skills for older women (an effort 
largely confined to the residence committees discussed above), and 
opening occupations to women which had previously been closed to- 
them — together with an emphasis upon delayed marriage and success- 
ful family planning to permit women to complete their education, 
and begin their work. The social welfare legislation plus neighborhood 
organizations aid women to combine marriage and work by reducing 
demands on them for shopping, child care, and numerous household 

The increased skills and training available to women make their 
employment opportunities more varied, such as the women members 
of the oil drilling teams in the Ta Ching oilfields, or a woman crane 
operator — whom we observed in the P'eng-pu commune — or women 
aircraft pilots. 

The Chinese women leaders were realistic about difficulties. They 
noted the need for special skills for women, recognized that full time 
work for women placed increased demands upon their husbands. They 
emphasized that the effort to aid women need not be divisive between 
husbands and wives. They said that some of the centers we had seen 
in the West Changan Neighborhood Association — that is, the sewing 
center — obviously provided advantages to working women but were 
not always available or adequate. 

At the same time, the Chinese women pointed out differences 
between boys and girls which they said should be recognized. For 
example, they commented that though school curricula were identical 
for boys and girls, the afterschool activities reflected the preferences 
of girls and boys as well as their differing physical makeup. They said 
fewer women were students at China's Science and Technology TTni- 


vcrsitv and were still small in number in the party (they did not pro- 
vide figures or percentages). We observed furthermore, in the course 
of our travels, remaining social patterns that affect economic relations 
between men and women. There are sex-typed activities, specifically 
child care centers, nurseries, and kindergartens; the work groups in 
the countryside which we saw still were largely either men or women 
with few mixed groups. Certain factory work is by accident or custom 
or preference largely female, for example the textile factory. We do 
not have sufficient evidence to say whether or not the lower paying 
positions are largely female, but there may be financial consequences 
to the differing work groups, especially in agriculture. 

In this changing social scene, the role of the women's federation was 
an interesting one and illustrative of mass organizations in general. 
When asked how they operated, we learned of the multifunctions of 
the federation. A women's federation under various names has existed 
since the earliest days of the party. It is under the control of the party 
and serves as the link between the party and women. Its tasks are first 
of all. to study the thought of Chairman Mao Tsetung and in small 
groups to raise the political consciousness of women. The task is 
universal whether it is practiced in the commune, factory, school or 
neighborhood. This means not only an educative role — also filled by 
the schools — but also the personal reinforcement of the communicative 
and administrative skills that will be useful in the society at large. The 
women's federation addresses itself to all women in all walks of life, 
where it popularizes political slogans such as "Learn from Tachai" or 
''Learn from Ta Ching" — the industrial model slogan — and the need 
for women to participate in socialist construction under these banners, 
but it translates these slogans into women's need-. The federation may, 
therefore, become a setting in which to develop confidence for those 
women not yet able or willing to speak out or participate in the lamer 
world. We were told that the federation also plays an important 
function in helping to identify potential leaders to be recommended 
for further training or differing appointments. This latter function 
has not been examined closely. It may mean identifying young women 
leaders and providing the opportunity for them to enhance their skills 
or to move into more responsible positions of authority. 

Social Control 

The emphasis in China, apparent throughout our visit, is upon 
voluntary compliance and support. In the communes, the cities, the 
factories, the neighborhood associations and the myriad of small 
groups that interface Chinese society, the emphasis is upon volun- 
tarism and cooperation. Whenever the delegation asked questions about 
differences of viewpoints, the response ahvays indicated that efforts 
to resolve differences focused upon persuasion. As one person in the 
context of such a delegation query said, "the minority is always per- 
suaded." No doubt this emphasis of Chinese societv — and other nation* 
as well — owes much to the Chinese tradition as well as to the leadership 
since 1949. Though legal codes did exist in pre-1949 China, they had 
alwavs been minimal in effect largely because of the instability in the 
society. In criminal offenses, the traditional Chinese state did intervene 
with quite severe sanctions, yet normal life did not require the instru- 


-sion of the state, nor seek it. Thus, to discuss the role of sanctions and 
the legal system in China we must begin with a frank acknowledge- 
ment that informal organizations, mutual discussions, and informal 
pressures are an important and largely effective means for dispute 
resolution and for control of social behavior. 

Some crime, however limited, does exist in China ; evil doers, often 
referred to as a "bad element" still exist. Though the frequency may 
be limited, occasional antisocial acts still occur. Ordinary crime is "a 
contradiction between people." Political crime is a "contradiction be- 
tween the State and the enemy." If convicted, one becomes "a bad 
element." In these circumstances how does the system operate? 

The delegation had hoped to observe a trial in Chinese courts. When 
we arrived, however, we were told that courts were not in session and 
therefore it would not be possible to observe a trial. Instead, our hosts 
had arranged for a discussion session in Shanghai on social and legal 
problems to afford us the opportunity to raise questions and issues. It 
was an extremely interesting meeting and illustrative of important dif- 
ferences in Chinese views o,f how behavior should be controlled. 

The Chinese presentation was in two stages. They provided us with 
an extremely detailed description of how they dealt with two social 
problems — prostitution and smoking of opium — in Shanghai shortly 
after 1049; then they turned to the legal system itself and discussed 
the judicial process, selection of judges and types of sanctions ranging 
from neighborhood supervision to prison (prisons are "thought re- 
habilitation centers or camps") sentences for adults and youthful 
offenders. The selection of social problems as the main emphasis with 
a secondary discussion of legal proceedings is probably a fair appraisal 
of the ways in which Chinese society seems to operate. Accordingly, 
we report on this topic as the Chinese presented it, incorporating 
where appropriate the important differences with our experience. 


In many ways, learning about the Chinese solution for prostitution 
and drugs in the city of Shanghai was an appropriate setting. This 
large seacoast city had an infamous reputation in pre-1949 clays. As a 
center of contact between the Chinese and the West, Shanghai was 
governed partially by Chinese but largely by three Western powers in 
specific sections of the city (the French, English and American sectors 
delimited as the outgrowth of the unequal treaty system). The city 
was notorious as a center of prostitution and drugs in the 20th century. 
The Chinese account, as was customary in most briefings, focused upon 
how a specific small unit, Ta Ching Lane, dealt with the problem of 

Ta Ching Lane is located opposite the largest department store in 
Shanghai, one familiar to most visitors to the city. The lane is part of 
the general residential area adjacent to Nanking Road, a section of the 
city covering 0.045 square kilometers, encompassing 14,000 families and 
a population of 51,000 people. It is now governed by nine street com- 
mittees and is somewhat smaller than the West Changhan Neighbor- 
hood Association we visited in Peking. Its population is roughly 
equivalent to that of a large commune, but the area is, of course, an 


urban one and hence densely settled. In prd-1949 days, Ta Ching Lane 
had a high concentration of brothels, gambling casinos and opium dens. 
Prostitution at that time, apparently, was licensed by the government 
and this lane had 24 licensed brothels. As one woman put it, "There 
was no difference between 'day and night' in the lane. The brothel keep- 
ers were women whose husbands were the local despots who suppressed 
the prostitutes." 

In 1949, upon the arrival of Chinese Communist forces, measures 
were taken by the People's government to bring the situation under 
control and to end organized prostitution. The government ceased 
issuing licenses and passed laws prohibiting brothels, together with 
instituting measures to reform brothel keepers. Some indeed were 
reformed and handed over their old licenses; others resisted, how- 
ever, and went "underground." As our hosts said, "The struggle was 
complicated and acute." The government apparently also mobilized 
the local population to realize the dangers of prostitution and, more 
importantly, to report instances of prostitution. This struggle con- 
tinued for almost 3 years. In 1952, the government sealed all brothels, 
and arrested all brothel keepers and prostitutes. 

The procedures followed in dealing with those arrested is illustra- 
tive of the process used throughout China for a variety of social pur- 
poses. The government held mass rallies within the various lanes, 
encouraging the population to criticize and repudiate the brothel 
keepers. Prostitutes were encouraged to go up on the stage and accuse 
the individual brothel keepers. The severity of the punishment for 
the accused differed depending upon his or her attitude. Those brothel 
keepers who had earlier handed in their licenses were assigned to 
productive labor. Those of lesser guilt, or who perhaps more easily 
admitted their guilt, were turned over to the alley organizations for 
reform under supervision. Those who were convicted of serious crimes, 
or who continued to deny their guilt, were sentenced to a lengthy 15- 
yenr prison term. 

The policy with respect to the prostitutes was different from that 
applied to the brothel keepers. Prostitutes were given political edu- 
cation and training in productive labor that would permit them to 
support themselves. Since most of the prostitutes had been recruited 
from the rural areas, those who still had homes were returned to the 
countryside. Many, however, had no homes or family. They received 
political, social and economic training and were employed in factories^ 
producing such items as dresses, handkerchiefs and other clothing 
items. Some prostitutes had men whom they washed to marry. They 
were usually allowed to do so. Since the early 1950's, the Chinese said. 
the problem of prostitution no longer existed, and those who entered 
into productive labor experienced no discrimination. 

In contemporary China, we were told, prostitution, though ex- 
tremely rare, docs remain a crime and is a matter for resolution by 
the social organizations. The criminal, however, in prostitution cases 
is only the woman — not the client. Cases of adultery do occasionally 
still occur. In general, this will bo handled through criticism and 
repudiation of the individual by the unit or small group. "Repeated 
cases might result in labor reform, the sentence based upon the serious- 
ness of the offense. Emphasis is now upon preventative work through 


lectures to the young about the importance of maintaining a revolu- 
tionary tradition and the new moral code of conduct. 

The procedure for bringing trafficking in and smoking of opium 
under control was similar in many respects to the discussion of prosti- 
tution. After 1949, the People's government passed a series of laws 
prohibiting the importation, manufacture, and marketing of opium 
and the running of opium dens. "Some recognized that the proletariat 
were in power and removed themselves from these activities." Others 
went underground. By 1952, the People's government had adopted 
broader measures for the comprehensive prohibition of opium smok- 
ing and trafficking. These policies were implemented by decentralized 
measures from the city down to the district, subdistrict and street 
and alley organizations. In meetings the masses were called upon to 
name all those involved in either smoking or traffic. Sentences were 
determined on the basis of the severity of the crime as well as the 
outlook and characteristics of the individual. Leniency was extended 
to those who acknowledged their fault and repented. Some who were 
denounced for serious crimes but showed a better attitude received 
a lighter penalty, while those with serious crimes who did not admit 
their guilt received serious punishment. 

In the above accounts, it should be clear that, with respect to severe 
social problems that confronted the Chinese Communist leadership, 
the emphasis was upon local units leading the attack on those criti- 
cized; and distinctions were made among all culprits, spotlighting 
serious offenders who then became the focus of local anger and of 
demands for punishment. 


The cases which come before Chinese courts are both civil and 
criminal. The nature of civil cases has changed somewhat since 19-19. 
In years past, the disputes were largely about ownership of land, 
unpaid debts and property rights. Today most disputes involve fam- 
ilies, marriage, and neighborhood difficulties. These disputes, the Chi- 
nese said, are examples of contradictions within the people and because 
of attention given to them at the grassroots level of organization 
only occasionally reach the court at all. Some criminal cases arise 
since criminals do exist, and have to be punished, but those who were 
forced or intimidated into criminal acts or have substantially coop- 
erated with the investigation and revealed all of their knowledge 
about the event should be treated more lightly. 

The punishments meted out to offenders should be noted carefully. 
In our discussions, ,our Chinese hosts pointed out that one level of 
sanction is "supervision of the masses." Individuals who are desig- 
nated as a "bad element" lose their political rights and their activities 
are closely watched. There is no doubt that some "bad elements" de- 
rived their status from involvement in the civil war. such as the hold- 
ing of certain ranks in the Kuomintang army, or from activities in 
the pre-1949 period, but the term was and is used for antisocial be- 
havior, as for example those involved in opium trafficking. 

The individual under the "supervision of the masses" cannot move 
without explicit permission and is required to report once a week to 


a small group designed by the local unit, but the individual is not 
penalized, we were told, with respect to his employment. We were 
told that the individual is not specifically assigned more difficult pro- 
ductive labor. The group reports weekly on the progress of the indi- 
vidual, with a 6-month summing up report and a yearly general 
summary. The group, if it observes good conduct and progress in 
ideological remolding, can recommend that the title of "bad element" 
be removed. Individuals may associate with the "bad element/' per- 
haps help in his remolding, and also report if he violates the expected 
code of conduct. 

The more serious sanction, for certain crimes or classes of indi- 
viduals, is reform through physical labor. The operation of the system 
of reform through physical labor was of considerable interest. Al- 
though our hosts described the prison system in some detail, they 
began by noting that, with respect to all acts that rim counter to 
expected behavior, the emphasis is upon giving the individual a "way 
out." In cases of prison reform through physical labor, the Chinese 
told us that these cases were very limited for adults and even more 
so for youthful offenders, and that the rate of recidivism was ex- 
tremely low — estimated at around 1 percent. 

With respect to the sentences meted out, the Chinese distinguished 
between those whose crimes were determined to reflect "contradictions 
within the people" and those reflecting "contradictions between the 
enemies and the people." The distinction is of some importance because 
the crimes designated as reflecting contradictions between the people 
and the enemy carried sentences almost twice the length of those re- 
flecting contradictions within the people. Most political cases are "con- 
tradictions between the enemy and the people." The distinction has 
implications outside of the determination of legal penalties and under- 
pins many of the Chinese views about the way that change can occur. 

Briefly, the difference reflects the Chinese leadership's view that 
some political conflict and styles and interests reflect actual social 
conditions. Those contradictions within the people exist for various 
reasons, ranging from inadequate education and understanding of 
Maoism to human frailty or incomplete development of socialist insti- 
tutions. They are to be resolved by discussion, education, and a more 
lenient view of the need for punishment through labor reform. The 
antagonistic ones are between the people and their enemies, and, there- 
fore, to be resolved through the exercise of dictatorship, force, and 
denial of political rights. 

Once a determination has been made about the sentence, the indi- 
vidual is given work according to his physical capability and its 
relationship to ideological reform. The priority is first on reform and 
second on production. The intent, however, is to provide the individual 
with some capability of supporting himself after the sentence is 

The prisoner serves something of an "indeterminate" sentence. 
Though a term is set, the prison organization can recommend to the 
court that the sentence be reduced or. in case of violations of prison 
regulations, can recommend it<? increase. A large number of the pris- 
oners when released also have the title of "bad element" removed, and 
political rights are restored. (An example cited was two groups of 


Chinese Nationalist officials released from prison in 1975.) While in 
prison, we were told, if the prisoner's family has no means of support, 
the family will be subsidized. It appears that the prisoner's status was 
not a sufficient reason to permit divorce by a spouse. The Chinese told 
us that permission for a divorce would need to take into account the 
prisoner's situation and the consequences of a divorce on his reform. 

Regulations within prisons appeared to be rather simple. The pris- 
oner was entitled to write two letters a month, but there was no limit 
on the number he could receive. Medical care was provided by the 
state without charge, Relatives could visit once a month. The right 
to write, receive letters, or visit could be withdrawn if the prisoner 
violated prison regulations. The prisoner could be quarantined for a 
period no longer than 1 week, but only upon the explicit approval of 
the leadership unit in the prison. 

Provisions for youth offenders appeared to differ somewhat. Our 
hosts indicated that prison sentences for youth were extremely rare. 
Youthful offenders were placed in separate facilities. Their programs 
were composed of half study and half work with emphasis largely 
upon education. They are frequently released ahead of time as rehabili- 
tation is judged to have occurred and virtually never is prison fol- 
lowed by mass supervision. We were not allowed to visit any prison 


The judicial process and the role of the judges in the Chinese judi- 
cial process differs in a number of important ways from those with 
which we are familiar. It was interesting, therefore, to see how they 
place the legal institutions and their judicial system in the context 
of the building of a Socialist state. 

In the Chinese view, the People's court is an important organ for 
exercising the right of power of trial and an important institution of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, In their view, when China is still 
moving from capitalism to socialism there will still be class struggle. 
In this period, we were told, the functions of the court should be 
strengthened and not weakened. 

The Chinese court structure is composed of a Supreme Court re- 
sponsible for organizing trials as well as certain educational func- 
tions, together with courts at the provincial and municipal levels. 
There is (1) a high court, (2) a district court — prefecture — at the 
intermediate level covering certain special administrative areas, or 
counties, together with (3) several county courts. In Shanghai, this 
svstem has been gradually developed since 1949 into a high court, an 
intermediate court and 10 county courts. All the People's courts have 
three functions: (1) To punish all criminal violations of law: (2) 
to handle correctly civil disputes: and (3) to carry on education and 
iniDart knowledge on the jurisdiction of law. 

The Chinese svstem is for each case to have two trials with the 
final one determinative. After the first trial, the defendant is en- 
titled to appeal to the intermediate court, but there is no formal ap- 
peal after the second trial. If there continues to be difficulty with the 
verdict, the defendant can appeal to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party— a right afforded all individuals by the 107.-) 


All trials are to be public except when private matters or state 
secrets are involved. In all trials the defendant can demand a person to 
aid iii his defense, or defend himself. When the court finds it neces- 
sary, it can appoint someone to defend him. 

The Chinese told us that their policy is to stress proof and not rclv 
mainly on oral testimony. The individual may ask the state for wit- 
but cannot compel their presence; there may he written testi- 
mony. Since most trials today take place in the unit where the crime 
occurred, the witnesses are already present and, if one does not wish 
to testify, another may be found. Considerable emphasis is placed 
upon material proof of the offense. 

The Chinese gave us a case example of the current system in opera- 
tion. They said that in 1975 a theft occurred in the Shanghai railroad 
administration bureau. Materials for transport were being stolen in a 
freight transportation center, where redirection of freight occurs. 
The theft was discovered and reported to the public security bureau. 
Representatives were sent to investigate and discovered the worker 
who had been doing it. The individual was arrested and an extensive 
investigation then occurred by the court. The court came to the work- 
shop and "relied upon the party and the masses there in the work- 
shop. " The case was tried in the workshop. In the course of the trial, 
it was discovered that not only did the worker steal but he also cor- 
rupted others. Eight youths came to the platform to accuse the man. 
There was public display of the materials stolen. In the face of the 
criticism, testimony and proof, the individual admitted his guilt in 

In this process it should be noted that two emphases emerged. The 
Chinese said that since the cultural revolution, the court system 
had adopted two slogans — "going out*' and "coming in." The going 
out referred to carrying on trials in the particular unit where the 
incident or crime occurred rather than in some remote courtroom. 
Second, "coming in" meant bringing the masses and the party di- 
rectly into the process rather than keeping them remote from the 
judicial process. By bringing the representatives of the Avorkers and 
masses into the process, the Chinese said the quality of the work had 
improved, because the masses, generally speaking, are correct. 

The selection of judges reflected a general emphasis on a revolu- 
tionary background and understanding. The Chinese said that judges 
were normally drawn from the workers, peasants or army people who 
understood the revolutionary line, the importance of class struggle 
and had a high cultural — referring to their educational background — 
level. They became judges only after a period of actual practice in the 
courts. Some came to this work after short training sessions in law 
sclmol«. others were from universities or special law schools, but all 
needed to have practice. This was especially important because some 
had been educated, under the bourgeois educational line. Individuals 
were appointed by the revolutionary committee of the identical level 
of organization. 

Decisions involve collective judgment. When the trial took place, 
the judges, of course, consulted with the masses. Each judge sought 
the view of the standing committee of the unit, as well as the party 
committee. The individual judge then formed a decision which was 
brought to the panel of judges of the court for discussion and then 
submitted to the court leadership. 


The judicial process in China shows a consistency in its working, 
given the assumptions about the nature of society in the movement 
toward socialism. It appears to be relatively informal in its opera- 
tions. While incidence of petty theft may occur more frequently than 
appears, the incidents appear to be handled at the local level and 
probably do not generally reach the legal system. The descriptions of 
the movements to abolish prostitution and opium smoking, both in 
form and descriptive language, seemed similar to procedures that 
are used throughout the system to insure support and approved social 
conduct. The emphasis upon persuasion and education together with 
the pervasive social organization limits the legal system's operation to 
cases that are too serious to be resolved at the local level in terms of 
their consequences. Thus, the example of theft in the railway transfer 
center obviously had implications that made it important to explore 
the problem. Marriage disputes or those between neighborhoods are 
•screened through successive layers of social organizations before 
reaching the degree of formality implied in judicial proceedings. 

In the actual resolution of disputes or of criminal proceedings 
however, the emphasis is not upon the adversary relationship as 
found in many American proceedings. In criminal cases, the investi- 
gations and operations may well be to "provide" a way out, but there 
was no emphasis on the presumed innocence of the accused. In a 
society which places such emphasis upon class background and 
struggle, such differences might be understandable, but it remains the 
fact that legal activities are not, apparently, conducted on the basis 
of highly detailed procedural safeguards for the individual. Since 
the Chinese see the court as an instrument for the exercise of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, then it would be a contradiction for 
it also to operate as the defense of the individual. Legal sanctions 
remain a last resort in China where so much local social pressure and 
discussion are available to insure appropriate action. This is not to 
deny the importance of legal sanctions, but to recognize that they in- 
deed might be used less frequently. 

The safeguards with respect to witnesses, appeals, and procedures 
do not constitute an important aspect of the system in China. Instead, 
though some of those procedures do exist, they are not emphasized as 
a protection for the individual. In fact, regard for the individual is 
contrary to the system, which describes individualism as "a filthv 
idea." Flexibility 'in the svstem with respect to sentences and penal 
operations may well operate to provide a less harsh series of correc- 
tional institutions. If Chinese recidivism rates approach the 1 percent 
quoted us, they may well indeed have discovered how to organize 
their society in sueh a wav as to forestall the need for much of the 
criminal anti-social behavior found in most Western countries. In 
that *vent however, it is essential to keep in mmd that the solution 
involves the whole society and not just the formal sanctions of the 
legal system. 

Leadership and the Chinese Communist Party 

On the day of our departure, January 8, 1976, Chou En-lai, Premier 
of the State Council of the People's Republic of China arid "V ice Chair- 
man of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, died. 


[The official announcement of his death is included as appendix 3„ 
p. 56.1 The shock and grief of our hosts — many of whom had worked 
with Premier Chou — together with the beginnings of the national peri- 
od of mourning made our departure from China even sadder than 
might have been the case. In reading the text of the funeral announce- 
ment one saw reflections of the 20th century history of the nation and 
of its ruling Communist Party. It made us pause to reflect even more 
upon the problems that confront China and the men and women who 
would have to make difficult choices in the years ahead. 

The transition of leadership in any society is a difficult matter. For 
the people of China, the turbulence and human waste that marked the 
years 1937— 49 (and 1966-69 during the Cultural Revolution) seemed 
largely to end with the establishment of the People's Republic of 
China and the consolidation of power by the Communist Party. 
Though there is ample evidence in the years since then, much of it 
explicitly described to us by our Chinese hosts, of the continuing 
struggles between different factions of the nation about appropriate 
policies to be followed the active political leadership of Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung and the administrative capabilities of Premier Chou afforded 
some measure of continuity in the face of competing pressures. The 
death of Premier Chou, whose ill health had been well known, evi- 
denced the inexorable tide of generational change. 

It is true, of course, that the Chinese have provided formal means 
for the appointment of successors. In an effort to ease the transfer 
of authority, as recently as January 1975, Chinese constitutional provi- 
sions were adopted to make explicit the procedures for succession. But 
in China, as elsewhere, events and circumstances often make such pro- 
visions less satisfactory than they might have seemed when adopted. 
The determination to maintain the ideological commitment expressed 
by Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party together with the 
inevitable storms and controversies — which we have highlighted in 
this report — make the possibility, though not the certainty of leader- 
ship turmoil a question to be considered. 

Congressional visitors before us have noted the importance of the 
Communist Party in the decisionmaking process of China. Our experi- 
ence reaffirms the centrality of the party's role. As a congressional 
delegation we naturally met with representatives of the Chinese gov- 
ernment whether at the central, provincial, or local level. Wherever 
we went, individuals who played key roles, were party members. In 
the communes, at the May 7th cadre schools, in the women's organiza- 
tions, the responsible men and women were almost always members of 
the party. The party member in China serves the linchpin function 
at all levels of the society. 

The growth in the Communist Party since its establishment in 1921 
has been enormous. Yet it remains a very small segment of the popula- 
tion, approximately 28 million members among a population of more 
than 700 million people. There was no information available to us 
about the distribution of party members throughout the country. 
Whenever we visited a specific unit, we would inquire about the party 
membership of individuals and our hosts were quite straightforward 
in telling us who were party members. But although it was relatively 
easy to determine on a microlevel membership in the party ^e were 


unable to gather comparable data for provincial units, membership 
in the mass organization. In general, therefore our experience mirrors 
that of other delegations that macrodata is more difficult to acquire. 
We do not attribute this to a lack of candidness on the part of our hosts 
but rather as a reflection of the priorities in statistical reporting in 
China and the very likely fact that local party members were not 
necessarily in a position to provide data on party membership in the 
large units of which they were a small part. 

The capacity of this small group to exercise such decisive authority 
derives from the hierachical organization of China which we have de- 
scribed above. Whether the topic is university selection, neighborhood 
committee plans or any of the myriad of ongoing policy decisions 
taken throughout Chinese life, the fact that higher authorities, or 
units, review decisions, that representative lists for election are sub- 
mitted for review by the higher level authority makes it possible for 
the Chinese Communist Party to intervene on a selective basis within 
the society. The various representative congresses in Chinese society 
meet infrequently and their standing committee makes what neces- 
sary ongoing decisions must be faced. It appeared that the standing 
committee, the revolutionary committees, and most certainly highest 
levels of governmental responsibility are dominated by the party. 

The explicit recognition of the importance of the party in the life 
of China's leadership is overtly seen in the funeral announcement of 
Chou En-lai where his party positions and memberships precede his 
governmental titles. We highlight this fact in our report to reem- 
phasize that understanding of the country and its future cannot be 
divorced from considerations about the party and its vitality and 
strength. The success or failure of Chinese modernization efforts, the 
maintenance of current domestic and international priorities, is inti- 
mately linked not only to substantive arguments that support different 
policy options but also to the new generation of party members who 
are now moving to take positions of leadership in China. 


Itinerary of Congressional Delegation to the People^ 
Republic of China 

Saturday, December 27, 1975 

8:00 a.m. — Depart Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., Special Mission 
Aircraft. Seen off by Ambassador Han Hsu and other members of the 
Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China. 

4 :00 p.m. — Arrive Hickam Air Force Base, Oahu, Hawaii. 

5 :30 p.m.-7 :00 p.m. — Briefing by Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief, 


7 :00 p.m. — Reception by Admiral and Mrs. Gayler. 
Overnight — Sheraton Waikiki Hotel. 

Sunday, December 28, 1975 

8 :00 a.m. — Depart Hawaii, Special Mission Aircraft. 

2 :00 p.m. — Arrive Guam Air Force Base refueling stop. Cross International 

Monday, December 29, 1975 

3 .00 p.m. — Arrive Tokyo Haneda International Airport. Met by Mr. William 
Breer of the U.S. Embassy. 

6 :30 p.m. — Reception by Ambassador and Mrs. Hodgson for Congressional Dele- 

gation and Japanese Women Diet Members and leaders in various fields. 
Overnight — Okura Hotel. 

Tuesday, December 30, 1975 

8 :30 a.m. — Depart Tokyo Haneda International Airport by Special Mission 

10 :30 a.m. — Arrive Shanghai Airport, welcomed by members of the Chinese 

People's Institute for Foreign Affairs (CPIFA). 
11:00 a.m.-2:30 p.m. — Brief car tour of Shanghai; lunch at Shanghai People's 

2 :30 p.m. — Departure by Chinese Commercial Aircraft for Peking. 
4 :00 p.m. — Arrive Peking. Airport welcome by members of CPIFA. 
G:30 p.m. — Banquet in honor of the Congressional Delegation bv CPIFA at the 

Peking Hotel. 

In addition to members of the Delegation and Acting Chief Harry Thayer 
of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, guests in attendance were : 
Mr. Chou Chiu-yeh, Vice-president, CPIFA 
Mrs. Kang Tai-sha, Vice-secretary General, CPIFA 
Mr. Fan Kuo-hsiang, Vice-division Chief, CPIFA 
Mr. Chen Wan-chen, Staff Member, CPIFA 
Mr. Tu Chi-wen, Staff Member, CPIFA 
Mrs. Ku Ke-ping, Staff Member, CPIFA 
Mrs. Chu Yu, Staff Member, CPIFA 
Mr. Hua Chun-doh, Staff Member, CPIFA 
Mr. Shen Chih-huan. Staff Member, CPIFA 
Mr. Wang Lien, Staff Member, CPIFA 
Mr. Chiu Pe-teh, Staff Member. CPIFA 
Mr. Ling Kuang-jung, Staff Member, CPIFA 
Mrs. Yeh Yun-ming, Staff Member, CPIFA 



Mr. Huang Chen, Chief of the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of 

China, Washington, D.C. 
Miss Wang Hai-jung, Vice-minister Foreign Ministry 
Miss Tang Wen-sheng, Vice-director, Department in Charge of American and 

Oceanian Affairs, Foreign Ministry 
Mr. Ting Yuan-hung, Division Chief, Department in Charge of American and 

Oceanian Affairs, Foreign Ministry 
Mrs. Chu Lin 
Mr. Chao Chi-hua, Vice Division Chief, Department in Charge of American 

and Oceanian Affairs, Foreign Ministry 
Mr. Fang Sung-hsueh, Vice Division Chief, Information Department, Foreign 

Mrs. Chao Chia, Staff Member, Department in Charge of American and 

Oceanian Affairs, Foreign Ministry 
Mr. Liu Ju-tsai, Staff Member, Information Department, Foreign Ministry 
Miss Lin Chiao-chih, Member, Standing Committee of the 4th National Peo- 
ple's Congress ; Head, Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the 

Capital Hosiptal 
Mrs. Sheng Li-hua, Deputy to the 4th National People's Congress ; Leading 

Member. General Office of the Education Ministry. 
Mr. Huang Yu-lin, Staff Member of the Foreign Affairs Department, Stand- 
ing Committee of the National People's Congress. 
Mr. Liu Hsiang-wen, Leading Member, Foreign Affairs Department, Peking 

Municipal Revolutionary Committee 
Mrs. Hsu Kuang, Vice-chairman, Peking Municipal Women's Association 
Mrs. Kuei Mei-yun, Vice-chairman, Trade Union of No. 2 State Cotton Mill 
Mrs. Li Feng-luan, Chairman, Women's Association of the Sino-Albanian 

Friendship People's Commune 
Miss Tu Pao-jung, Girl Cobbler, Shoe Workshop of Chung-wen Municipal 

Mrs. l"u Hsiu-fang, teacher as well as vice-chairman of the revolutionary 

committee of No. 32 Middle School of the West Municipal District 
Mrs. Hsu Chung-chi, Chairman, Fengsheng Neighborhood Revolutionary 

Mrs. Ku Feng, Staff Member, Peking Women's Association 
Mr. Chu Hung-teh, Security Office 
Mrs. Chang Meng-yi, Reporter, Hsinhua News Agency 
Mrs. Wang Ching-ying. Photographer, Hsinhua News Agency 
Mrs. Chen Huan, Radio Peking 
Mr. Sun Yung-fu, Assistant to TV 
Mr. Yen Li-chih, Assistant to TV 

Overnight — Through stay at Peking Hotel, Peking 

Wednesday, December 31, 1975 

8 :30 a.m.-12 :00 — Visit to West Changan Neighborhood Association. 

12 :00-1 :30 p.m. — Lunch with members of the American Liaison Office, hosted 

by Acting Chief Harry Thayer. 
3 :00 p.m.-5 :45 p.m. — Meeting with People's Republic of China Foreign Minister 

Chiao Kuan-hua; also present, Acting Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Harry 


Thursday, January 1, 1976 

9 :30 a.m.-12 :00-^Meeting with Mme. Hsu Kuang, Vice-chairman of the Peking 

Municipal Women's Association, together with other representatives of the 
Association, discussing the changing role of women in China since 1947. 

1 :30 p.m.-5 :00 p.m. — Outing to the Great Wall. 

Evening — Film Show, "Protecting the Giant Panda" and "Chinese Climbing of 

Friday, January 2, 1976 

10 :00 a.m.-12 :45 p.m. — Meeting with Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. Also present, 

Mme. Li Su-wen, Vice chairman, National People's Congress. 


12 : 15 p.m.-2 :00 p.m.— Lunch at the Great Hall of the People, hosted by Mme. Li 

2 :()() :00 p.m. — Visit to Chung Wen District May 7th Cadre School. 

Saturday, January 3, 1976 

9:00 a.m.-12:00 — Visit to Central Institute of Nationalities (a college to train 
national minority cadres). 

2 :00 p.m.-5 :00 p.m. — Visit to former Imperial Palace, archeological exhibition, 
air defense tunnel. 

Evening — Delegation Return banquet for Chinese friends at Peking Duck Res- 
taurant (guest list same as p. 45), plus Mme. Li Su-wen. 

Sunday, January 4, 1976 

9:00 a.m.-12:00 — Trip by air from Peking to Chengtu, Szechuan via Chinese For- 
eign Ministry aircraft. 

12 :00 — Welcome at Chengtu Airport. 

1 :30 p.m.-5 :30 p.m. — Visit to Tien Yuan Commune "Tachai" agricultural brigade 
including a primary school run by the brigade, visit to a Buddhist temple in 

7 :00 p.m.-7 :45 p.m. — Meeting with Hsu Chih, Vice-chairman, Szechuan Revolu- 
tionary Committee. 

7 :-T» p.m.-9 :30 p.m. — Musical Soiree. 

( )\ ernights— Tung Fang Hotel throughout stay in Chengtu 

Monday, January 5, 1976 

8 :30 a.m.-5 :00 p.m. — Day-long visit to Tukiangyen irrigation system in Hsientu 

County including the Temple of the Two Kings and tour of a deer farm. 
7 :00 p.m.-9 :00 p.m. — Tour of downtown Chengtu area. 

Tuesday, January 6, 1976 

9:00 a. m.-10:45 a.m. — Trip by air from Chengtu to Kweilin in Kwangsi Autono- 
mous Region via Chinese Foreign Ministry Aircraft. 

11 :00 a.m.-12 :30 p.m. — Visit to Kweilin Silk Spinning Factory. 

1 :30 p.m. — 5 :00 p.m. — Briefing on Chinese efforts to restore historical and scenic 
sites. Tour of Reed Flute Cave and Piled Festoon Hill. 

Evening — Movie : "New Kweilin." 

Overnight — At Kweilin Guest House. 

Wednesday, January 7, 1976 

8 :30 a.m.-lO :30 a.m. — Trip from Kweilin to Shanghai via Chinese Foreign Min- 
istry aircraft. 

11 :00 a.m.-12 :30 p.m. — Tour of Shanghai Industrial products in Shanghai Ex- 
hibition Hall. 

2 :30 p.rn.-o :45 p.m. — Two programs : 

Visit to P'u-tou District Children's Palace, or 

Discussion of Chinese Social & Legal Problems and the legal system. 

Evening — Shanghai Philharmonic Concert. 

Overnights — Throughout stay in Shanghai at Chin Chiang Hotel. 

Thursday, January 8, 1976 

9 :00 a. m. -12 :00 — Two Programs : 

Visit to Pen-p'u Commune, or 

Visit to Shanghai Museum. 
1:30 p.m.-5:00 p.m.— Visit to No. 1 Middle School affiliated with Shanghai 

Teacher Training College. 
Evening— Farewell banquet for Delegation hosted by Mme. Vice-Chairman, 

Shanghai Revolutionary Committee. 


Friday, January 9, 1976 

9 :00 :00— Two Programs : 

Visit to Hsin Hua Hospital, or 

Visit to Shanghai Electrical Machinery Factory. 
4 :00 p.m. — Depart Shanghai by Special Mission jet aircraft. Cross International 

11 .00 p.m. — Depart Hickam Air Force Base, Oahu, Hawaii. 

Saturday, January 10, 1976 
4 :00 p.m. — Arrive Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. 


Joint Communique Issued by the People's Kepublic of China and 
the United States on February 28, 1972, Following President 
Richard Nixon's Visit 

[From the Peking Review, No. 9, Mar. 3, 1972] 

The Chinese and U.S. sides reached agreement on a joint communique 
on February 27 in Shanghai. Full text of the communique is as follows: 

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's 
Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Re- 
public of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the 
President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant 
to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials. 

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party 
of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange 
of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs. 

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held be- 
tween President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of rela- 
tions between the United States of America and the People's Republic of 
China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secre- 
tary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in 
the same spirit. 

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial 
and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, 
continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of 

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of 
America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years with- 
out contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. 
They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and 
great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective postions and 

The Chinese side stated : Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. 
Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want 
revolution — that has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big 
or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong 
nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and 
it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated 
that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations 
for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right 
to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to 
safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own 
countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. 
All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese 
side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia 
in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the 
seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Re- 
public of South Viet Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the 
two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Sum- 
mit Conference of the Indochinese People. It firmly supports the eight-point 
program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand 
for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilita- 
tion of Korea". It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japa- 
nese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an inde- 



pendent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India 
and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on 
the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their 
respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu 
and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their 
struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination. 

The U.S. side stated : Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts 
both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. 
The United States will work for a just and secure peace; just, because it fulfills 
the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress ; secure, because 
it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports indi- 
vidual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of out- 
side pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce 
tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have dif- 
ferent ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, mis- 
calculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual 
respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate 
judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared 
to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed 
that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny with- 
out outside intervention ; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated 
solution ; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Viet Nam and 
the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of 
that objective ; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States en- 
visages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent 
with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United 
States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Keren : 
the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxa- 
tion of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United 
States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan ; it will con- 
tinue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Se- 
curity Council Resolution of December 21, 1971. the United States favors the 
continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of 
all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the 
ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of 
the people of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military 
threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry. 

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their 
social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, 
regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles 
of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggres- 
sion against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes 
should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. 
The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply 
these principles to their mutual relations. 

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated 

— progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United 
States is in the interests of all countries ; 

— both wish to- reduce the danger of international military conflict ; 

— neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed 
to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony ; 

— neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into 
agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. 

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples 
of the world for any major country to collude with another against other coun- 
tries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest. 

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and 
the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position : The Taiwan question 
is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China 
and the United States ; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the 
sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long 


been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal 
affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces 
and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Govern- 
ment firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of '"one China, one 
Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Tai- 
wan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined". 

The U.S. side declared : The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on 
cither side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that 
Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge 
that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the 
ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations 
from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and mili- 
tary installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. 

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between 
the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science. 
technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts 
and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate 
the further development of such contacts and exchanges. 

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit 
can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual 
benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to 
facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two count; 

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, 
including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to 
time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between 
the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest. 

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit 
would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They 
believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only 
in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the 
relaxation of tension in Asia and the world. 

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appre- 
ciation for the gracious hospitality shown them bv the Government and people 
of the People's Republic of China. 

Comrade Chou Ex-lai Passes Away 

[From the Peking Review, Jan. 16, 1976] 

(Obituary Notice Issued by C.P.C. Central Committee, X.P.C. Standing 
Committee and State Council) 

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China announce with extreme grief : Comrade Chou En-lai, Mem- 
ber of the C.P.C. Central Committee, Member of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. 
Central Committee, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau 
of the C.P.C. Central Committee, Vice-Chairman of the C.P.C. Central Commit- 
tee, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and Chair- 
man of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference, died of cancer at 09 : 57 hours on January 8, 1976, in Peking at the 
age of 78. 

Comrade Chou En-lai was a fine member of the Communist Party of China, 
a great proletarian revolutionary of the Chinese people, a loyal revolutionary 
fighter of the Chinese people and an outstanding, long-tested leader of the Party 
and the state. 

Since Comrade Chou En-lai fell ill in 1972, he had been given meticulous, 
many-sided treatment by medical personnel under the constant and affectionate 
attention of our great leader Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee. 
He persevered in work all the time and waged a tenacious struggle against the 
illness. Owing to the worsening of his conditions despite all treatment, Com- 
rade Chou En-lai, the great fighter of the Chinese people, finally departed from 
us. His death is a gigantic loss to our Party, our army and the people of our 
country, to the cause of China's socialist revolution and construction, to the 
international cause of opposing imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, as 
well as to the cause of the international communist movement. 

Loyal to the Party and the people, Comrade Chou En-lai fought heroically 
and with utter devotion for the implementation of Chairman Mao's proletarian 
revolutionary line and for the victory of the cause of the Chinese people's 
liberation and the cause of communism, to which he selflessly dedicated all his 
energies throughout his life. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao, Comrade 
Chou En-lai made indelible contributions and performed immortal services to 
building and developing the Marxist Communist Party of China, to building and 
developing our invincible people's army, to the victory of the new-democratic 
revolution and the founding of socialist New China, to consolidating the great 
unity of the people of all nationalities led by the working class and based on the 
alliance of workers and peasants and developing the revolutionary united front, 
to the struggle for the victory of the cause of socialist revolution and construc- 
tion, the victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the move- 
ment to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, and the consolidation of the dicta- 
torship of the proletariat of our country, to strengthening the unity of the 
international revolutionary forces and to the struggle against imperialism, social- 
imperialism and modern revisionism, and thus won the wholehearted love, re- 
spect and admiration of the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the 
whole country. 

The life of Comrade Chou En-lai was one of glorious fighting for the cause 
of communism ; it was a life of persevering in continuing the revolution. 

The news of Comrade Chou En-lai's death will arouse deep grief in the hearts 
of our people. We must turn our grief into strength. The whole Party, the whole 
army and the people of the whole country should learn from Comrade Chou 
En-lai's proletarian revolutionary spirit and his noble revolutionary qualities 



and, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman 
Mao. unite as one, take class struggle as the key link, adhere to the Party's 
basic line, persevere in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, uphold proletarian internationalism, consolidate and develop the 
victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and strive to consolidate 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, combat and prevent revisionism, build China 
into a powerful modern socialist country and win victory for the cause of 

Eternal glory to Comrade Chou En-lai, great proletarian revolutionary of 
the Chinese people and outstanding communist fighter. 

How Tachai Builds Up a Socialist Countryside 

[Prom the China Reconstructs, November 1974] 

(By Kuo Feng-Lien, Secretary of the Communist Party Branch of Tachai 
production brigade) 

Visitors to Tachai production brigade in Shansi province like to climb Tiger 
Head Hill for a bird's eye view of our land and village. They see staircase after 
staircase of green terraced fields held on the slopes with stone walls. A canal 
winding around the mountains and an electric pumping station guarantee water 
for fields which grow more than 7.5 tons per grain per hectare. Hoppers running 
on five aerial cables lift manure up to the terraces and bring quarried stone down 
for construction. 

At the foot of the mountain is our village, its street flanked by a supply -and- 
marketing co-op, credit co-op, restaurant, bookstore and post office. At the end 
of the street are our homes — rows of houses, cave-style or brick-and-tile, built 
on steps cut into the hillside with fruit trees growing in front of them. We 
draw water from taps in front of our houses and all homes have electric lights. 
Our 80 families — about 400 people — have a seven-grade school, clinic, nursery- 
kindergarten and recreation club within walking distance. 

Right next to our homes, though, behind a big willow tree, we have kept 
several mud cave-dwellings. We have preserved them because we don't want our 
young people to forget what the old Tachai was like. We lived in low, damp caves 
like these before liberation, and the landlord often tied peasants to the willow 
and beat them. 

In those days the village's 53 hectares of land lay in 4,000 tiny plots scattered 
over badly eroded slopes and ravines. Most of this was owned by one landlord 
and three rich peasants. The forty poor and lower-middle peasant families were 
either their tenants or hired hands. All year long they worried about paying the 
rent and exhorbitant interest on the debts they owed. There was no energy left to 
try to get better harvests. If they got 50 kilograms of grain on a small piece of 
land 20X30 meters, it was considered a good year. 

How did the old Tachai change into today's Tachai? Chen Yung-kuei, our 
old Party branch secretary, says it was because "we work to revolutionize peo- 
ple's thinking". This is our first task in everything we do. Peasants armed with 
Mao Tsetung Thought work harder to build socialism. Changes in our thinking 
translate into changes in our land, our harvests and our village. 


Chairman Mao says, "Socialist society covers a considerably long historical 
period. In the historical period of socialism, there are still classes, class contra- 
dictions and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and 
the capitalist road, and there is the danger of capitalist restoration. We must 
recognize the protracted and complex nature of this struggle. We must heighten 
our vigilance. We must conduct socialist education. We must correctly under- 
stand and handle class contradictions and class struggle, distinguish the contra- 
dictions between ourselves and the enemy from those among the people and 
handle them correctly. Otherwise a socialist country like ours will turn into its 
opposite and degenerate, and a capitalist restoration will take place. From now 
on we must remind ourselves of this every year, every month and every day 
so that we can retain a rather sober understanding of this problem and have a 
Marxist-Leninist line." 

This is the Party's basic line during the socialist period. Our Tachai Party 
branch constantly educates its leaders and the brigade members with this con- 
cept, urging them to keep to the socialist road in class struggle. 



Tachai was liberated In 1I>4.~,. The next year the peasants received land in 
the land reform. Chairman Mao had called on everyone to get organized and (hen 

Yung-Kuei and some poor and lower-middle peasants formed a mutual-aid team. 
In 1!>.".i> Chen want to the county Party committee and applied to form a semi- 
socialist farming cooperative in which the land would l»e pooled. But for a year 
the committee withheld its approval. 

Impatient with the delay, the Tachai Party branch got the poor and lower- 
middle peasants together and discussed Chairman Mao's speech, "Get Orga- 
nized!", particularly this: "Among the peasant masses a system of individual 
economy has prevailed for thousands of years, with eaeh family or household 
forming a productive unit. This scattered, individual form of production Is the 
economic foundation of feudal rule and keeps the peasants in perpetual poverty. 
The inly way to change it is gradual collectivization, and the only way to bring 
about collectivization, according to Lenin, is through cooperatives." 

They were sure that a cooperative was the right step to take next. What they 
didn't know was that the influence of Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line was causing 
the county Party committee to put off its approval. Liu had been against agri- 
cultural collectivization since the first mutual-aid teams appeared. He was for 
an individual economy and "giving a free hand to hiring labor". He insisted on 
"a policy to preserve the rich-peasant economy". He even said, '"Exploitation 
should be welcomed." Later he was to order the agricultural cooperatives dis- 
banded on a large scale. 

The Tachai Party branch kept insisting on forming a cooperative. Finally in 
1953 the county Party committee approved — but limited it to 30 households. 
Thirty households! We already had 49 in mutual-aid teams. The Party branch 
decided to ignore the limit and so ahead with all 49. That year the new co-op 
brought in a bumper harvest of 1.8 tons per hectare — more than twice what the 
individual farmers got. More households joined. 

After two years we took another step forward in collectivization and ad- 
vanced to a fully socialist co-op. Our land became collectively owned, individuals' 
draught animals and farm tools were bought by the co-op. 

In 1958 an even bigger and stronger form of collective economy, the people's 
commune, was formed in China's countryside. Tachai became a production brigade 
in one of them. We worked even harder to improve production and that year 
reaped an average of four tons per hectare, five times more than when we had 
farmed individually. 

Again. Liu Shao-chi was dead set against the people's communes. When drought 
and flood hit most of the country in 1959-61, he used these difficulties as a good 
opportunity to break up the communes. With his encouragement, capitalist trends 
appeared in the countryside that seriously hurt the socialist economy — free mar- 
kets, the extension of private plots, the increase of small enterprises responsible 
for their own profit and loss, and harvest quotas based on individual households. 
Lin Piao also supported fixing quotas on individual households. 

It was a critical rime. The Tachai Party branch got the brigade members to- 
gether to discuss Chairman Mao's statement that "only socialism can save 
China". They recalled the bitter life of the old society, analyzed the capitalist 
trend in the countryside and talked about the superiority of socialist collectiviza- 

During these three hard years, the Tachai people kept firmly to the socialist 
road. They loaned several dozen tons of their own reserve grain to other brigades 
in trouble. At the same time they fought the crippling results of bad weather, won 
good harvests and were even able to sell their surplus grain to the state in all 
three years. Tachai's stubborn defense of socialism inspired the poor and lower- 
middle peasants of the other brigades to struggle against capitalist trends in 
their own areas. 

In the autumn of 1962 Chairman Mao. at the Tenth Plenary Session of the 
Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, sharply criticized 
Liu Shao-chi's right opportunist line and warned the nation. "Never forget class 
struggle." In 1964 he pointed out. "In agriculture, learn from Tachai." 

A movement started by Chairman Mao to educate the peasants in socialist 
thinking was already under way in the countryside. A Liu Shao-chi man in the 
Shansi province leadership sent a work team to Tachai under the pretext of 
helping with socialist education. Instead, they tiled to frame its lenders on false 
charges, claiming they had reported higher harvest figures than the brigade had 
actually reaped. The work team spent days weighing both stored and distributed 
grain. The figures were accurate to the kilogram. 


Then the Tachai Parry branch and the poor and lower-middle peasants held 
meetings in which they' discussed right and wrong in the light of Chairman 
Mao's ideas on class struggle. They came out of the meetings more confident 
than ever that they were on the correct road. They told the work team, "You're 
here to wreck our brigade, not do revolutionary work.'' More and more isolated, 
the work team finally quietly withdrew. 

In 1965 Chairman Mao specifically named the target of the socialist education 
campaign in the countryside : "Those persons in authority in the Party taking 
the capitalist road." The target was the same in the cultural revolution that 
followed. In the cultural revolution and in the present movement to criticize 
Lin Piao and Confucius, we have settled accounts with Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao 
and their followers, repudiating their counter-revolutionary revisionist line and 
their conspiracy to restore capitalism. 


The Tachai Party branch also teaches the brigade members how to use Mao 
Tsetung Thought in the struggle for production. It encourages us to develop 
production through self-reliance. 

'•We cannot lean on others when we make revolution," Chen Yung-kuei often 
tells us. "We can build a new Tachai only by relying on our own will and our 
own hands." 

When we first formed our co-op in 1953 we drew up a ten-year water and soil 
conservation plan which included basic improvement of our land. We would 
turn the slopes into terraced fields, build fields in the raviDes and plant trees on 
the mountains. We were less than 300 people — with only 50 able-bodied men and 
women. We had only hoes and shoulder poles. Transform the harsh pattern of 
nature? It seemed an unequal struggle, but we accepted the challenge. 

In the winter of 1955 we went to work on Wolves' Den, a sharply-sloping ravine 
1.5 kilometers long and 6.6 meters wide. By spring we had turned it into terraced 
fields. That summer a rainstorm swept it all away. We built the terraced fields all 
over again the following winter. Again mountain torrents washed everything 

In the winter of 1957 our Party branch led us to Wolves' Den for the third 
time. This time we increased the number of terraces, curved the retaining walls 
against the torrents and made them wider at the base. There were 44 walls built 
with 300-kg. blocks of stone which we quarried in the mountains and carried 
down with shoulder poles. We filled these terraces with thousands of cubic 
meters of soil. It took us 27 days in the piercing cold, but the hard work paid 
off. The walls have withstood many mountain floods since. 

In ten years and 250,000 workdays we built 200 stone walls and linked up 
separate plots. We spread soil at least a foot deep in the terraces, deep-plowed 
it and built it up with manure and compost. With water, fertilizer and the soil 
safely held in, our terraced fields gave us more than 5 tons per hectare in 1962. 

Then the next summer we had the biggest flood in a hundred years. Driving 
rains began in early August and did not let up for seven days. Water crashed 
down through the ravines, destroyed most of our terraced fields, flattened the 
crops and wrecked all but two of our houses. 

As soon as the rain stopped the Party branch called a general nieetinsr. Chen 
Yung-kuei stood up and proposed reconstruction through self-reliance. Together 
with the members he reviewed our ten-year plan and how we had finished it by 
relying on our own efforts. 

"There will always be difficulties in building socialism." he said. "If we hold 
out our hands to the state for help now, we will be setting a bad example for 
the young people. We'll be encouraging them to ask the state for help every time 
they are in difficulty. What kind of successors will we be bringing up to carry 
on the cause of the proletariat?" 

The state did send us relief — money, winter clothing, medicine. Three times it 
came, three times we sent it back. A few bad elements in the brigade called us 
fools. But when these enemies said we were wrong we knew we were right. 

We went ahead to rebuild our land and homes. In the daytime we repaired the 
fields, made compost, fired bricks. At night we rebuilt our wrecked homes by the 
light of gas lamps. The winter of 1963 was very cold. One day we were rebuilding 
fields in a ravine two kilometers from the village. At noon we found our lunches 
frozen. "If we had had even bits of frozen food in the old days," Chen Yung-kuei 


said to us young people, "we wouldn't have had to go begging." He talked about 

the history of his family and the village. 

He said (hero were five "manys" in the old Taehai— many hired out to land- 
lords or rich peasants, many who owed debts, many who had to beg, many forced 
to sell their children, many who committed suicide. His family of five had nothing 
to their name. Two hired out to landlords, three went begging. One particularly 
had year the landlord they worked for pressed so hard for the debts they owed 
him that there was no way out but to sell mother, sister and brother. He and his 
father went on as hired laborers. When the father was too old to be useful any- 
more, the landlord kicked him out. He hanged himself. Chen Young-huei was left 

The sun was setting. Chen Young-huei told us girls, "Go home now and get 
some rest." 

"No," we said, "if yon older people can go on working, so can we."' 

We young men and women formed two shock teams and vied for the heaviest 
work— carrying stones and building walls. "Our hoys hive iron shoulders.'' the 
older people said, "but our girls are made of iron too." After that we were called 
the "Iron Girls" team. 

We finished rebuilding our fields in a year and a half. Soon the new houses — 
the ones you see today — were also completed. They were much more spacious than 
the ones we had before. 

The year following the big flood, 1964, we averaged 6 tons per hectare of grain. 
In the ten years since then, we have gone in more and more for scientific farming, 
gaining experience in selecting and breeding good strains, close planting, field 
management, protecting crops from pests and diseases and reforming our system 
of cultivation. We used to grow only one crop a year. Now we interplant low-yield 
and high-yield crops and reap two harvests a year. We have added wheat and rice 
to corn and millet. 

Electricity came in 19G5. With brigade accumulation funds, which had been 
increasing year by year, we bought machines for threshing, milling and grinding. 
This liberated a large part of our labor force, especially the women, who used to 
grind the 115 tons of grain we consumed every year by hand. 

Most of the heavy transport has been taken over by vehicles and our aerial 
cables. We send up several thousand tons of manure to the fields every year. Trans- 
porting by cable hoppers saves us 10,000 workdays a year. AYe made our own ex- 
plosives and since 1971 have blasted away 36 hilltops and leveled four ravines 
with a bulldozer to make large level fields which can be irrigated and cultivated 
by machines. 

Our grain yield has long topped 7.5 tons per hectare, ten times more than before 
liberation. Y\ r e have 60,000 fruit and timber trees. We have also multiplied our 
draught animals and pigs. We have an ample grain reserve. Our public accumu- 
lation fund is 800,000 yuan — about 10,000 yuan per household. Every family has 
its own reserve grain and savings in the bank, quite a few with deposits of one 
or two thousand yuan. 


Just before the birth of the People's Republic of China Chairman Mao pointed 
out that the education of the peasantry was a serious problem. 

Collectivization has gradually done away with the system of private ownership 
of the means of agricultural production. But remnants of private-ownership think- 
ing formed by several thousand years of individual peasant economy have vet to 
be wiped out. 

Precisely because such a change cannot be brought about in one day, from the 
beginning of collectivization twenty years ago, the Taehai Party branch has 
helped its peasants to use Mao Tsetung Thought to develop the proletarian idea 
of farming for the revolution and love for the socialist state and the collective. 
This paves the way for a complete break with private-ownership ideas. 

Chao Hsiao-ho is a good example of how this works. He herded sheep for a 
landlord before liberation and was sold to another landlord in another county. 
After liberation he came back to Taehai. The year the co-op became fully 
socialist, it sent Chao to the next county to buy two oxen. He returned with 
three. The third one. belonging to a neighboring co-op, had followed him home. 
Chen Yung-kuei told him to take the ox back, but he said, "I'm doing this for 
the collective, not for mvself." 


"Small-groupism is actually a form of narrow individualism," said Chen 
Yung-kuei. "Chairman Mao pointed this out for us long ago. We must not only 
care for our own collective but also other collectives. - ' 

When Tachai became a commune brigade, Chao Hsiao-ho became a cart-driver. 
Carrying construction materials back from the county town one day, he brought 
back an extra section of rolled steel. Chen Yung-kuei said he should take it back. 
"But the state will never miss such a small section of rolled steel," Chao argued. 

"The state is a big socialist collective," said Chen. "We should care even more 
for this bigger collective." Chao took the steel section back. 

The Party branch helped Chao Hsiao-ho study Chairman Mao's works, show- 
ing him what revolution meant. Chao was inspired by the lives of the revolu- 
tionaries praised by Chairman M?o — Chang Szu-teh who served the people whole- 
heartedly, and Norman Bethune, the Canadian doctor who gave his life for the 
Chinese revolution in a spirit of utter devotion to others without any thought 
of self. Trying conscientiously to become like them, Chao Hsiao-ho grew into 
a new-type peasant with a proletarian world outlook and utterly devoted to the 

In 1972 we had the worst and longest drought in a hundred years. It lasted 
17 months, way into the spring of 1973. Our corn simply had to be watered or 
it would be lost. We got word that we could bring water from the county reser- 
voir through our canal. Chen Yung-kuei came to us and said, "The water in the 
reservoir is running low too. Shall we let the other brigades have it?" 

We agreed. All the able-bodied men and women in our brigade went to get 
water from a well 2.5 kilometers away. With a shoulder pole, each could bring 
two buckets per trip, enough for just six plants. We needed 3,000 buckets — 
a total of 7,500 kilometers of walking — for every hectare. And there were 30 
hectares. But we did it. Our 1973 harvest was the biggest in our history. 

Every year in the last two decades we have not only fulfilled our quota of grain 
to the state but sold large amounts of surplus grain, too. 

Through criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, Tachai's leaders and members 
became even more fully aware of the importance of continuing the revolution. 
We held meetings criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius during work breaks and 
in the evenings. Many families hold their own small meetings. Applying Chair- 
man Mao's theories on class struggle, we saw why Lin Piao regarded Confucius' 
idea of restraining oneself and restoring the old order as a maxim. Though 
the two lived two thousand years apart, they were alike. Both made last-ditch 
efforts to prop up the declining exploiting classes they represented. Confucius 
wanted to restore the slave system for the slaveowning class. Lin Piao wanted 
to restore capitalism for the landlord and bourgeois classes. 

"We can see Lin Piao and Confucius were two rotten melons on the same 
rotten vine," the members said. "Lin Piao tried to overthrow China's dictatorship 
of the proletariat so that landlords and capitalists could ride roughshod over us 
again. We'll fight anyone who tries to drag us back to the old ways !" 

The criticism has made the Tachai brigade members more determined and more 
enthusiastic about building socialism. This year, as soon as the Spring Festival 
was over, we began a new battle to turn still another ravine into a level field 


Map of Trip: Map of Chengtu Area 

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